Command and control security: concepts and practices. by Unkenholz, Willard L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1989
Command and control security: concepts and practices.
Unkenholz, Willard L.













Thesis Advisor Milton H. Hoever











3 DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT
Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) 5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)





7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
Naval Postgraduate School
ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 939^3-5000
7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
Monterey, CA 939^3-5000




9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER









TITLE (Include Security Classification)
COMMAND AND CONTROL SECURITY: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICES
PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Unkenholz, Willard L.









The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
cosati codes
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP
18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
Command and Control (C )
Command, Control, and Communications (C )
Security
ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
The United States is placing greater emphasis and reliance on command and control
stems to be able to span the distances involved in, and keep pace with, a modern
ttlefield. This greater reliance on command and control systems also creates a
tential vulnerability to disruption or defeat through successful attacks against those
me systems. Security is therefore of prime importance to the design and operation of
mmand and control systems.
The goal of this thesis is to provide students of command and control (C ), as well as
signers and program managers of command and control systems, a basic understanding of the
ed for security in C systems and an introduction to security measures used to counter C
reats.
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to provide a conceptual framework for the
ptinued study and analysis of command and control security and to emphasize the need for
signing security into command and control systems as an integral component.
DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT
5JUNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT Q DTIC USERS
21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
'apt. Milton H. Hoever, USN
22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)
(403) 646 - 2995
dc OFFICE SYMBOL
54HO
FORM 1473, 84 mar 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted
All other editions are obsolete
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
ft U.S. Government Printing Office: 1986—606-24.
UNCLASSIFIED
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited




B.S., Virginia Polytechnic 'Institute and S.U., 197:
M.S., University of Southern California, 1981
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY





The United States is placing greater emphasis and
reliance on command and control systems to be able to span
the distances involved in, and keep pace with, a modern
battlefield. This greater reliance on command and control
systems also creates a potential vulnerability to disruption
or defeat through successful attacks against those same
systems. Security is therefore of prime importance to the
design and operation of command and control systems.
The goal of this thesis is to provide students of
2command and control (C ) , as well as designers and program
managers of command and control systems, a basic
2
understanding of the need for security in C systems and an
2introduction to security measures used to counter C
threats
.
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to provide a
conceptual framework for the continued study and analysis of
command and control security and to emphasize the need for
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INTRODUCTION
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own
hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is
provided by the enemy himself (Sun Tzu,p. 26)
.
A. WALKER-WHITWORTH
On May 19, 1985, John Walker was arrested in Rockville,
Maryland for espionage—selling United States (U.S.)
cryptographic secrets to the Soviet Union for the previous
17 years. The next day, his associate Jerry Whitworth was
arrested in Sacramento, California. The consequences of the
Walker-Whitworth spy ring were judged by then Director of
Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral W.O. Studeman as having
".
. .jeopardized the backbone of this country's national
defense. ..." (Barron, 1987, p. 212) The Secretary of
the Navy, John Lehman declared that " . . .had we been
engaged in any conflict with the Soviets, it could have had
the devastating consequences that ULTRA had for the
Germans. ..." (Barron, 1987, p. 212) These opinions were
reaffirmed in court by George Carver, a former deputy to the
director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He stated:
The United States will have to invest an enormous amount
of time and resources changing systems, changing
procedures, at great dislocation. It [the United
States] can never be positive that it has locked all the
barn doors to keep future horses from straying. I
cannot be totally confident about the security of its
communications, particularly its military and especially
its naval communications. And the damage thus done, in
my opinion, could significantly, if not irrevocably,
tilt the very strategic balance on which our survival as
a nation depends. (Barron, 1987, p. 213)
It was not only U.S. officials that understood the
magnitude of this breach in U.S. security. The KGB
official and defector Vitaly Yurchenko related the
importance the Soviet Union place on this spy ring:
1
.
The KGB regarded the Walker-Whitworth case as the
greatest in its history, surpassing in import even
the Soviet theft of Anglo-American blueprints for
the first atomic bomb.
2 The cryptographic data supplied by Walker and
Whitworth enabled the Soviets to decipher
"millions" of secret American messages.
3. The three principal officers who supervised the
case received the highest Soviet decorations.
4 One of the senior KGB officers who briefed
Yurchenko stated that in event of war, this Soviet
ability to read enciphered American messages would
be "devastating" to the United States. (Barron,
1987, p. 148)
This was not a case of the communication security
equipment failing to perform its designed security
functions. It was a failure in the administration of
personnel security that compromised U.S. communication
systems. Failure in this one critical security element,
caused the overall security system to fail and led to the
devastation of United States military communication systems
with the potential for equally devastating consequences to
United States national security.
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B. IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY IN MILITARY ACTIONS
Security is one of the primary elements required by
military forces for the successful completion of their
assigned duties. The U.S. Armed Forces Staff College lists
security as one of the nine principles of war along with
objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver,
unity of command, surprise, and simplicity. It defines
security as:
SECURITY - Never permit the enemy to acquire an
unexpected advantage. Security is achieved by
establishing protective measures to counter surprise,
observation, detection, interference, espionage, or
sabotage. (AFSC Pub 1, 1986, p. 1-5)
The importance of security to military operations is
not a new concept. Within his book The Art of War , written
around 400-320 BC (Orr, 1983, p.l), the ancient Chinese
warrior Sun Tzu also wrote about an army's need for
security
.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position
that makes defeat impossible and does not miss the
moment for defeating the enemy. (Sun Tzu, p. 30).
In this passage from his discussion on tactics, Sun Tzu
focuses on two aspects of war; the defensive and the
offensive sides. The defensive portion of war seeks to
prevent an adversary from gaining the advantage and
exploiting a vulnerability or mistake. The offensive
3
portion seeks to exploit an adversary's vulnerabilities and
achieve victory. Sun Tzu believed that defeat is the result
of one's own vulnerabilities (Sun Tzu, p. 26). The Walker-
Whitworth episode demonstrates clearly how vulnerabilities
in command and control systems can seriously affect the
security of a military force.
C. FRAGMENTATION OF SECURITY
Although security is an important element of military
success, it is an element that is not well understood.
Often it is assumed to be the responsibility of a select
few to assure adequate security is provided. Part of this
lack of understanding derives from the secrecy surrounding
the application of many security measures such as
cryptography. But the lack of understanding can also be
partially attributed to the fragmentation of security into
its supporting security elements. Cryptography resides
within the academic bounds of mathematicians. Physical
security is the responsibility of "security forces" and
manufacturers of barriers and access equipment. Computer
security is itself fragmented between groups that provide
physical security for hardware and software storage mediums,
the users with their procedural security measures, and
computer programmers trying to design in rules within the
software to prevent unauthorized access to information.
Personnel security is relegated to an administrative
4
bureaucracy of background investigations and clearance
messages. Unfortunately this fragmentation allows security
to be unevenly applied often with oversights occurring which
create serious vulnerabilities. The greater the reliance,
the more devastating the consequences of exploited
vulnerabilities
.
D. SECURITY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
2 . .The field of command and control (C ) is receiving
greater emphasis within the United States military today.
To highlight its importance to effective modern warfare, the
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) has established an Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications,
3 . ...
and Intelligence (CI) and assigned him the responsibility
to assure command and control requirements are fully
considered in a weapon system' s development and to
2coordinate C development between the services. President
Reagan also emphasized the vital need for command and
control when he stated that the command and control systems
must be given the same priority as the weapon systems that
they control (DOD, 1988, p. 100). Weapon systems are
useless, no matter how well designed, unless there is also a
reliable and survivable way to use them.
The modern battlefield is changing. Where once command
and control consisted of organizing, training, and leading
men armed with swords and spears on a small parcel of land,
5
today's battlefield can be global in size, last only minutes
in duration, and result in the devastation of a nation
rather than simply the defeat of an army. The commander now
requires the means to communicate and "see" over the horizon
or around the world. He needs to be able to assess
potential threats within the precious few minutes provided
him by the speed of modern weapons and be able to execute an
appropriate response in the remaining few minutes. The
command and control requirements for range, speed, and
accuracy have drastically changed from Sun Tzu's requirement
for drums and banners (Sun Tzu, p. 64)
.
Along with this emphasis on the need for greater
command and control is the application of advanced
technology to attempt to satisfy this need. Computers and
software are being employed to speed up the processing,
integration, and display of information needed by the
command and control system. Fiber optics, packet networks,
satellites, and meteor burst are all communication
technologies being used to transmit more data at a faster
rate, and more reliably, in order to fulfill the needs of a
command and control system. Modern command and control is
becoming more complex because of the ability of electronics
to record, process, and transmit data. With the pace of
modern warfare, electronic command and control is vital to
the effectiveness and safety of today's troops, planes,
ships, and weapon systems. They are no longer a luxury, but
a necessity in combat.
This greater and greater reliance on electronics to
provide command and control functions also increases the
security requirements to maintain that capability in time of
conflict and to prevent defeat through the destruction or
disruption of the command and control systems. But
security measures must be applied in a systematic manner to
counter specific threats to be effective.
The systematic approach to security requires gaining an
understanding of the nature of security, an understanding of
the nature of command and control, recognition of the
threats to command and control systems and possible security
measures that can be applied to counter these security
threats, and an appreciation for how each of these security
measures must integrated into an overall security system.
The rest of this thesis is devoted to providing a basic
understanding of each of these subjects.
II. WHAT IS SECURITY? - A CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE
Protecting a nation's defense secrets from compromise is
an age-old challenge. However, the stakes for the
United States have never been higher. Given the
extraordinary importance of advanced technology to our
nation's military capabilities, its loss to a potential
adversary - by espionage, theft, or other unauthorized
disclosure - can be crucial to the military balance. So
too, can compromise of operational plans or battle
tactics. Thus to the extent that classified information
can be kept from the hands of those who may oppose us,
the qualitative edge of United States military forces is
preserved and their combat effectiveness assured.
(Commission to Review DOD Security Policy and Practices,
1985, p. 5-6)
A. MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS
Security is a common word that is used in different
contexts to mean many different things. The word
"security" is often used to refer to the office that
maintains security clearances or controls the local police
force. Sometimes the word "security" is used to describe
the procedures used to protect classified information.
"Security" is also used to describe various technologies
such as locks, barriers, alarms, or even more elaborate
mechanisms that are used to protect something of value.
Often, the word "security" is modified by a preceding
adjective such as physical, procedural, or national. It can
be even preceded by a noun such as communication,
transmission, or operation. "Security" has a different
meaning depending on who is using it and how it is used.
8
Webster's New World Dictionary actually has six
definitions of security. The last three deal with peculiar
financial uses of the term, such as providing collateral for
loans or in describing stocks and bonds. But the first
three definitions are of more direct interest to the
military's use of the word.
SECURITY n. :
1. the state or feeling of being free from fear, care,
danger, etc.
2. freedom from doubt; certainty;
3. protection; safeguard.
(Webster, 1969, p. 670)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) use three definitions
to further refine how the word security is used in the




1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or
installation to protect itself against all acts designed
to, or which may, impair its effectiveness.
2. A condition which results from the establishment and
maintenance of protective measures which insure a state
of inviolability from hostile acts or influences.
3. With respect to classified matter, it is the
condition which prevents unauthorized persons from
having access to official information which is
safeguarded in the interests of national security.
(JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 306)
9
These definitions describe security as the "measures
taken", the "condition which results", and the "condition
which prevents". They reinforce the confusion over what is
actually meant by the term "security".
By comparing both the Webster and JCS definitions of
security, the results can be grouped into two distinct
categories. The first category describes security as a
condition of being, feeling of being safe, or state of
nature. This category encompasses the first two Webster
definitions as well as the second JCS definition. The
second category looks at security as being a process, an
act, a procedure, or a mechanism. Security is something
that acts upon its environment. These are two fundamentally
different perspectives of what is meant by security.
For this thesis, the first category's definition will be
implied when the term " security " is used - it is the
condition, state, or feeling of being safe from danger; the
level of security. The term " security measure " will be used
to convey the second definition - the idea of the mechanisms
or procedures which help to achieve this state of safety or
certainty. By providing distinct terms for each class of
definition, confusion over the precise meaning of the word
will be avoided.
Individual security measures will be further grouped
according to the type of protection they offer against
10
potential threats. These groups will be called " security
elements " and refer to such broad categories of security
measures as communication security, physical security, and
procedural security. These definitions are summarized
below:
Definition 1 : Security - is a condition, level, state
of nature, or feeling of being safe which results from
the establishment and maintenance of security measures.
Definitions 2 : Security measures - are those procedures
or technologies taken by an individual or group to
protect against actions that threaten, impair, or
destroy its survival or effectiveness.
Definition 3 : Security elements - are groupings of
security measures that protect against a common threat
or act in a similar manner. Examples of security
elements are physical security, communication security,
computer security, and emissions security.
B. THE NATURE OF SECURITY
Even with an agreed upon definition, what really is
security? What are its components? How do these
components relate and interact to achieve security? How is
security measured? How are areas requiring higher states of
security identified? And how much security is enough?
These are not easily answered questions and yet, these are
precisely the questions that must be answered in order to
effectively incorporate security. These are also the
questions that each military commander must correctly answer
to achieve his assigned mission.
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In order to sense the nature of security, an intuitive
approach will be used to discover many of its underlying
concepts. A person walking through several different
sections of a city at night, intuitively senses that he is
safe in one section of a city that is crowded with people,
well lighted, and well patrolled by policemen. That same
person walking along lonely, dark, and seemingly isolated
sections of the city, has a feeling of danger and caution.
In the first instance, there is a state or feeling of pure
safety and well being (full security), and the second is the
feeling of being in imminent danger (no security) . Between
these two extremes, a whole spectrum of states of security
can be imagined with differing degrees of the feeling of
safety and danger. This leads to the first hypothesis
concerning the nature of security which is stated below and
diagramed in Figure 1
.
Hypothesis 1 : Security can be considered a spectrum of
states of nature ranging from imminent danger (no
security) to pure safety (full security)
.
If the first hypothesis on the nature of security is
accepted, what contributes to these varying levels of
security? In the well lighted section of town, several
factors contribute to this sense of security. First, the
perception of the threat is very low. Because of the
crowds of people and good lighting, the chances of a
criminal getting away from the scene of a crime unnoticed
12
NO SECURITY FULL SECURITY
25% 50% 75% 100#
Figure 1. Security Spectrum
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is much less likely. In other words, the probability of
detecting a crime is greater in the well lighted section of
town as opposed to the darker section. This detection is
perceived to deter a criminal from an attempt.
In addition to detection, if a serious crime were
attempted in the well lighted section, potential help is
nearby either from the local police or simply from the
nearby crowd. The reliability of that help or response is
much greater than in the dark and lonely section of town. A
crime committed in that section of town could not only be
undetected, but also unaided. Under those circumstances, a
criminal is much less likely to be caught and therefore may
be more willing to attempt a crime.
A third aspect of this scenario, is not as readily
obvious as detection and response. This is the concept of
penalty for an action. If the only penalty that those
responding to a detected crime could inflict upon the
criminal was verbal harassment, this would not be
sufficient to stop a determined criminal. If on the other
hand the criminal was subjected to direct gun fire either
from persons defending themselves or by the responding
police, the crime could be stopped through the threat of
death, or the actual wounding or death of the assailant.
Between these two extremes are the penalties that the
criminal justice system is able to administer. The greater
the penalty, the greater the sense of security.
14
These intuitive observations lead to the next four
hypotheses about the nature of security:
Hypothesis 2 : Security is a function of the detection,
response, and penalty mechanisms (security measures)
applied to the environment.
Hypothesis 3 : The greater the probability of detection,
the greater the security.
Hypothesis 4 : The greater the reliability of response,
the greater the security.
Hypothesis 5 : The greater the magnitude of the penalty,
the greater the security.
These relationships may not be strictly true in all
instances. The first exception is in the application of
one of the three types of security measures (detection,
response, penalty) without the other two. If there is
detection, such as an activated burglar alarm, but there is
no response or penalty associated with this detection, then
the detection may be ignored by the assailant. Response by
itself would never be summoned without first a detection
and would be pointless without some measure of penalty. And
penalty without detection and response would simply be
indiscriminate. The three must work together. This leads
to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 : Detection, response, and penalty security
measures cannot exist independent of each other.
Another example where the three relationships may be
more complex is when time is considered as another
15
variable. One argument in particular concerns whether or
not more nuclear weapons in a country's arsenals to inflict
even greater damage on an adversary actually leads to
greater security. Is it true that the possible penalty of
inviting a nuclear retaliation has prevented war in Europe
as Hypothesis 5 would predict, or does the increase on one
side simply lead to an increase of force on the opposing
side in a spiral fashion leading to less security than
before? If time is also considered as a variable in the
security equation, then it is quite reasonable to believe
that both arguments may be true. Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5
may be true at any fixed point in time, but if these
variables are also subject to variability in time, then an
increase in penalty may not in fact lead to more security at
a future point in time. It depends on how the threat has
changed over time relative to the security measures
employed. This leads to a seventh hypothesis:
Hypothesis 7 : Security is a function of how the threat
changes in time relative to security measures employed.
If the threat is relatively constant, then security
measures once deployed to achieve an acceptable level of
security, and maintained from deterioration, will continue
to be an adequate safeguard. But if the threat is dynamic
or if it evolves in response to applied security measures,







evolve to counter the new character of the threat. The
following corollaries are derived from Hypothesis 7:
Security is a function of time.
Threat is a function of time.
Security measures are a function of time.
Security is a function of the threat.
Security measures must be maintained
relative to the threat or their effectiveness
deteriorates over time.
Corollary 7.6 ; Security measures and the threat are in a
constant, cyclical, action/response, and evolutionary
relationship.
In summary, security is a function of time and the
level of detection, response, and penalty applied to the
environment by security measures. As the threat changes,
the security measures must also change to meet the new
challenges. And as security measures change, the threat
will also inevitably change.
C. THE SECURITY PROCESS
In essence, the relationships between the threat,
security measures, and value of the protected item can be
considered to be a process function. The threat can be
considered the input to the process, the security measure
the transformation of the threat, and the remaining value
the output of the process. A simplified model of the






Figure 2. Basic Security Process
The threat is the potential hostile action that can
change the value of the protected item. The security
measures are actually the conglomeration of individual
security measures employed to resist, impede, or minimize
the impact of the threat on the security level.
If both the threat and security measures are reduced
into finer components, a better picture of the complex
nature of this process is obtained. For example, if the
threat consists only of an aerial bombardment and a frontal
tank assault, and the security measures employed consist of
anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank missiles, the resulting
security process is depicted in Figure 3. In this case the
anti-aircraft gun is only effective against the aerial
bombardment, and the anti-tank missiles effective only
against the tanks. If the security measures are not 100%
effective, then there are differing levels of effectiveness
associated with each security measure which in turn affects
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Hypothesis 8 : The relationship between a threat,
security measure, and value of a protected item is a
process with threat as the input, the security measures
as the transformation, and the remaining value as the
output of the process.
Hypothesis 9 : The threat and security measure can be
composed of several different individual elements.
Hypothesis 10 : For each security measure, there is an
associated theoretical probability of successfully
stopping a particular threat, ultimately affecting the
value of the protected item.
If each threat could be identified along with its
associated security measures, and if all these threat
processes were combined into a larger diagram, the result
would be the overall security system.
Hypothesis 11 ; The combination of all security
processes is a system (security system)
.
D. MEASUREMENT OF SECURITY
Another important topic to discuss concerns how
security is measured. Often this is done by first placing
a value on the item or characteristic that is to be
protected. For an automobile, it may be the blue book
value; for an individual, it may be his life; for a
military unit, it may be its ability to perform its
assigned mission; and for a nation, it may be the retention
of its basic culture, principles, and goals. As is apparent
from the preceding list, not all values are easily
quantified. Even so, there is often extensive effort made
to transform more qualitative values into monetary values to
20
be able to take advantage of the many financial decision
tools available.
The Department of Defense has developed its own
valuation system for national security information --
security classification. The following excerpt from JCS Pub
1 defines the DOD security classification system and its
various categories
:
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - A category to which national
security information and material is assigned to denote
the degree of damage that unauthorized disclosure would
cause to national defense or foreign relations of the
United States and to denote the degree of protection
required. There are three such categories:
a. TOP SECRET - National security information or
material which requires the highest degree of
protection and the unauthorized disclosure of which
could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally
grave damage to the national security. Examples of
"exceptionally grave damage" include armed hostilities
against the United States or its allies; disruption of
foreign relations vitally affecting the national
security; the compromise of vital national defense
plans or complex cryptologic and communication
intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive
intelligence operations; and the disclosure of
scientific or technological developments vital to
national security.
b. SECRET - National security information or material
which requires a substantial degree of protection and
the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably
be expected to cause serious damage to the national
security. Examples of "serious damage" include
disruption of foreign relations significantly
affecting the national security; significant
impairment of a program or policy directly related to
the national security; revelation of significant
military plans or intelligence operations; and
compromise of significant scientific or technological
developments relating to national security.
21
c. CONFIDENTIAL - National security information or
material which requires protection and the
unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably be
expected to cause damage to the national security.
(JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 307)
The three measurement levels that can be assigned are
"extremely grave damage", "serious damage", and "damage".
These are not easily quantified but constitute the method
for identifying the change to the level of national security
if these items were not protected. They are in effect
measuring the decrease in national security from the 100%
level rather than the remaining amount of national security.
To be able to measure security, the threat must first
be measured or estimated. Using the two threat example of
aerial bombardment and frontal tank assault, Figure 4 shows
how each threat level can be diagramed as a probability
distribution. Because a threat is a potential action, it is
uncertain exactly what level of threat will be encountered.
Figure 4 also shows the mean of the distribution and three
possible combinations or scenarios of the aerial and tank
threats: A, B, and C. Figure 5 shows these combinations in
a matrix form. Because of its uncertainty, the threat level
is a stochastic variable.
Figure 6 shows an expansion of Figure 1 with measurement
scales assigned. On the left hand side is a measurement of
the "Level of Threat" measured in a percentage of the














































































































hand side is a measure of the "Value" of the "Protected
Item" and is measured in a percentage of its full value. In
the middle is a scale of the level of security afforded by
the applied security measures. It is a percentage of the
potential threat that can be resisted by the security
measures. The percentage of the potential threat that
cannot be resisted is called the vulnerability of the
security system. It is through the security system that the
"threat level" is transformed into a change in the "value
level".
For example, if the "protected item" is a museum
painting, then the dollar value of the painting would
correspond with the "value". If there are no security
measures applied, but the threat has not been executed in a
"hostile action", then the painting still retains its full
value. The "security level" would be 0% of the threat and
the "vulnerability level" would be 100%. Zero applied level
of threat is transformed in this system to a zero level
change in the value of the item. If on the other hand, the
same security system is used but a 100% level of threat is
applied in the "hostile action", then the painting could be
either stolen or destroyed resulting in a remaining value of
zero
.
If the system is changed so that there is a 75% security
level (25% vulnerability level) and only a 30% threat level
is applied in the hostile action, then the value of the
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protected item would remain 100%. The threat level was
below that of the security level. If the threat were
instead 80%, then 5% of the hostile action would be allowed
to penetrate to the protected item which could result in
possibly damage or vandalism which in turn would decrease
the value of the painting.
The "protected item" does not always have to be an
object with a monetary value. In the case of a
communication system, the "protected item" may be the
connectivity of the system. A state less than 100% would
represent a degraded system, and 0% would represent a
complete severance of the system. For this thesis, the
following definitions will be used in the theoretical
discussions
:
Definition 4 : Protected Item - The object, system, idea,
information, or characteristic that requires security.
Definition 5 : Value - The remaining importance or
effectiveness of the protected item measured in a
percentage of its full importance or effectiveness.
Definition 6 : Security Level - The percentage of the
potential threat that the security system can resist.
Definition 7 : Vulnerability Level - The percentage of
the potential threat that the security system cannot
resist. The vulnerability level is equal to the
difference between the threat level and the security
level
.
Definition 8 : Threat - The potential force an adversary
can exert to decrease the value of the protected item.
Definition 9 : Threat Level - The measure of the
potential force an adversary can exert measured in a
percentage of the maximum force level
.
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Definition 10 : Hostile Action - The actual execution of
a threat.
(Security measure was already defined in Definition 2)
E. ECONOMIC LEVELS OF SECURITY
So far the discussion of security has centered only on
the nature of security. The following discussion will now
focus on factors determining how much security is
economical
.
The first observation in considering the economic level
of security is that security measures have a cost
associated with them. In the example of the person walking
through a city at night, the various security measures
employed were extra lighting and greater police protection.
There was capital investment in the installation of the
street lights as well as operating costs associated with
providing electricity and maintenance costs in replacing
defective bulbs, painting the lamp posts, and repairing
damaged lines and equipment. There were also the hidden
costs of the judicial system. If funds for street lights
were reduced, the detection capability would also be
reduced. If funds for the police were similarly reduced,
detection, response time, and response ability could be
seriously affected. And if funds for the judicial system
were reduced, the court cases could begin to back up, jails
would become crowded, and penalties may be reduced to ease
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the crowding and backlog. Each of these decreases in funds
could ultimately lead to a corresponding decrease in
security
.
Hypothesis 12 : There are costs associated with
employing security measures.
These costs are not only financial, they can also
involve other characteristics of value. The elaborate
security measures utilized by the Secret Service to protect
the President not only have financial costs associated with
them, but they often cost the public a disruption of normal
traffic flow. They also cost the President mobility,
flexibility, and public contact. The application of
communication security equipment to radios can cost the
operators flexibility with whom they can talk, possibly a
degradation in the quality of the communications, and a
restriction in the locations from which they can talk. This
is in addition to the strict accounting procedures required
for all cryptographic equipment and keys. The security
measures employed to protect different classification levels
of information can severely restrict the distribution of
vital information that would be helpful in the conduct of a
military mission. The cost, in this case, is that the
mission operates with a greater level of uncertainty than if
the participants were able to receive the information.
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Recognizing the difficulty in determining (1) a
quantitative value of security, (2) the true cost of
security measures, and (3) assigning meaningful
probabilities to the security process, it is instructive
nevertheless to assume these difficulties away and utilize
decision theory to describe how decisions can be made
concerning economical security measures
.
Again the city street example will be used with several
assumptions applied. The first assumption deals with the
value of the item to be protected. In this example, the
item to be protected is a $100 bill carried in a man's
wallet. A $20 can of mace is the only security measure that
will considered. The police have determined that the man
has a 40% chance of being involved with an attempted robbery
in this section of town but robbery is the only threat.
Figure 7 depicts this problem in the form of a pay-off
matrix. The question is whether or not it is economical for
the man to purchase the can of mace (pay the cost of
security)
.
If the man knew precisely the state of the threat
(decision under certainty - no probabilities) then in the
first state, when he knew he would be robbed, he would
always buy the $20 can of mace leaving him with a total of
$80 after his walk as opposed to losing the entire $100
without buying the mace. If he knew for certain that he
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would not be robbed, then he would always not buy the mace,
saving him the $20 purchase price.
SECURITY MEASURE THREAT ENVIRONMENT
ROBBERY NO ROBBERY
(.4) (.6)
CARRY MACE $80 $80
NO MACE -$100 $100
Figure 7. Security Application of Decision Theory
Most real world problems concerning the purchase of
security measures are not that well defined and the states
of nature are uncertain. When the element of doubt is
included in the model, the decision making process becomes
much more complicated. "Decision under risk" must be used
where there is uncertainty about the state of nature that
will be encountered but the probabilities of the states of
nature can be estimated. Using an "expected monetary value"
method of decision making, it would then be more economical
to buy the mace. The expected monetary value for purchasing
the mace would be $80 as opposed to only $20 for not buying
the mace. If the probabilities were not known, then other
techniques for decision making under uncertainty would then
have to be used.
This was an extremely simple example to show how
decision theory can be applied to making economic decisions
regarding security measures. Expanding the threat,
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increasing the number of security measures, making the
threat and security measures variable over time, and not
being able to quantify precisely the probabilities or
security outcomes only further compound the complexity of
the problem. Judgement and experience is often substituted
for the purely analytical approach in extremely complex




As was implied in Hypothesis 11, security is not
achieved though a single security process consisting of only
one threat and one security measure influencing the
security level. Although it is helpful at times to study
these fundamental processes, the acceptable level of
security is more often achieved through the application of
several security measures to thwart multiple threats. A
military battlefield is a good example where the threat can
be an intelligence threat, or a physical threat from land,
sea, or air. A military commander employs a whole variety
of security measures such as his assigned weapons, mine
fields, guards and sentries, fences or obstructions, secure
communications, patrols, and security procedures for
protecting classified information. This then is the
commander's security system.
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Definition 11 ; System - a set of elements united as a
whole for achieving a goal. (Taylor, 1988)
The set of elements in a security system incorporate
the individual security measures. The goal of the system is
maintaining an acceptable security level . By enhancing the
block diagram of Figure 1 and drawing a system boundary, the
security system can be defined. Figure 8 depicts this
generalized model of a security system.
The system includes the collection of all security
measures and the control process that coordinates each
measure to achieve the final goal which is the acceptable
level of security. The threat is the environment within
which the system must operate. The level of security, or
value of the item, becomes the measure of the effectiveness
of the security system. Figure 9 illustrates how security
measures can be integrated together to form a security
system.
There are two major types of security measures, passive
measures and active measures. The passive measures are
boundaries and barriers that restrict access to the
valueditem. These measures include optical barriers
(optical security) to prevent visual observation of the
valued item, electrical barriers (TEMPEST) to restrict the
electrical emanations from the valued item, and physical
barriers (physical security) , such as fences and walls, that
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surrounded the valued item, and were 100% effective, there
would be no threat to its security. But it would alsobecome
useless. Even those authorized for access would be
prevented.
To allow for this authorized access, there are certain
controlled paths, (optical, physical, or electrical) that
penetrate the passive security barriers. Each of these
controlled paths has certain active security measures used
to maintain the security along that path. The optical
control includes such things as removable screens and
covers. The physical access paths are controlled by
procedural and personnel security measures. Electrical
paths are controlled by communication security, computer
security, and transmission security measures. The active
security measures can themselves be further sub-divided into
the detection, response, or penalty components discussed
previously
.
Surrounding the entire security system is operation
security which attempts to merge these divergent security
techniques into a cohesive entity. Operation security also
prevents the operations of the individual security measures
from revealing information about the valued item or about
vulnerabilities to the security system.
Vulnerabilities to security systems often exist due to
the misapplication of security measures, gaps between
security measures, or the fact that each security measure is
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not 100% effective. To analyze how an individual security
measure's vulnerabilities contribute to the vulnerability of
the entire system, each security measure used to counter a
specific type of threat can be thought of as a separate
component with its own stochastic security rating. These
ratings can be thought of as component reliability figures
and can be analyzed in the same way reliability networks are
analyzed. By combining the various security measures in
series and parallel networks, an overall security rating for
the system theoretically could be achieved as was depicted
previously in Figure 6.
The final element of the security system that needs to
be discussed is the security system control. The control
mechanism measures the outcome of the security process,
provides feedback to a decision point to compare the outcome
against some desired goal or security level, and adjusts the
security system to adapt when required. It may also be
desirable to have feedback from sensors that measure the
character and strength of the threat. This then becomes
classic decision making or a cybernetics loop.
G. SECURITY SUMMARY
Security is vital to protect things of value whether
they are the national character, the effectiveness of a
military unit, or a child's piggy bank. Unfortunately
security measures are often misapplied or not thoroughly
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applied. This can lead at best to a waste of resources,
men, equipment, and money. It can also lead to a false
sense of security - the feeling of being safe when a
careful analysis of the security system would reveal glaring
vulnerabilities that have been overlooked. By understanding
the nature of security, how security measures can be
effectively combined into a system, and how to analyze them
with respect to the threat, more effective and economical
security systems can be designed and fielded to meet a
constantly changing and evolving threat.
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III. THE NATURE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
United States superiority on the future battlefield will
require application of technologically superior weapons
in precise places and time. Command and control systems
will be required to locate and confirm quickly the
identity of specific enemy units; determine the proper
response; direct weaponry on the target; confirm
destruction; and assess battle damage. (DOD, 1988,
p. 153)
A. AN EXPLORATION OF THE MEANING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
In order to be able to effectively provide security,
the nature of what is to be protected must first be
understood. This chapter is therefore devoted to
describing the nature of command and control and
highlighting its characteristics that are important to
security
.
Just as security is a misunderstood word, the term
command and control is even more confusing. This is
reflected in the many labels that are used to mean command
and control, such as C , C , CI, C 4 , and C 4 I . Each of
these labels is important to emphasize the different and
important aspects of command and control such as
communications, computers, intelligence, and
interoperability, but it tends to confuse discussions on the
true nature of command and control.
It is more than simply acronyms that cause this
confusion. The term command and control is used just as
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often to refer to communication systems as it is used to
mean the process by which commanders make and disseminate
decisions. In some circles, command and control means the
data processing capability while others see it as a
collection of interconnected electronic devices. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff have decided not to join in the battle of
acronyms. In their Dictionary of Military and Associated
Terms - JCS Pub 1 they use only the term "command and
control". Their definition incorporates all of these
elements of command and control . The JCS define command and
control as follows:
COMMAND AND CONTROL - The exercise of authority and
direction by a properly designated commander over
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications,
facilities, and procedures which are employed by a
commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment
of the mission. (JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 74)
Taking a close look at this definition is helpful in
understanding exactly what the JCS means by command and
control. The central player in this definition is the
commander. He is the person performing the action of
command and control. This leads us to the first hypothesis
concerning command and control
.
Hypothesis 13 : Command and control is a function
performed by the commander.
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But there is more to the description of the commander.
He is not just any commander, but a "properly designated"
commander. This implies that there is an organization and a
process by which commanders are selected and assigned to
specific position with authority over assigned forces and
with specifically assigned "missions". These observations
lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 14 : The commander operates within a larger
organization
.
Hypothesis 15 : The commander is specifically assigned to
his position by the organization.
Hypothesis 16 : The commander is assigned a specific
mission to accomplish.
Hypothesis 17 : The commander is assigned authority over
specific forces.
Hypothesis 18 : The commander accomplishes his mission
through his assigned forces.
The most crucial portion of this definition to the
understanding of command and control, is that command and
control is the "exercise of" the commander's authority.
This leads to the next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 19 : Command and control is the process by
which a commander exercises his authority.
Command and control is not a communication system; it
is not intelligence collection; it is not the computer
processing, analysis, or fusion of data; and it is not how
well forces can operate together on a battlefield. Command
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and control is simply the process by which a commander
exercises his authority.
A vital definition that is missing from the JCS Pub 1 is
that of "authority". Again using Webster's dictionary,
authority is defined as:
AUTHORITY, n. - the power or right to give commands,
enforce obedience, take action, or make final decisions
(Webster, 1969, p. 50)
In essence, command and control is a process by which
commanders make decisions and direct actions by use of
their assigned forces. This leads to another hypothesis:
Hypothesis 20 : Command and control is a decision making
and force directing process.
The JCS definition of command and control does not stop
simply at defining command and control. It continues to
divide "the exercise of authority" into subgroups: planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling.
Hypothesis 21 : Command and control incorporates the
functions of planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling of forces and operations to accomplish its
decision making and force directing process.
Hypothesis 22 : Essential elements of command and control
are the commander, the mission, the assigned forces, the
organization, and the means to decide and direct.
To summarize, command and control is a process by which
a designated commander determines what courses of action
need to be performed to accomplish his assigned mission, and
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directs his assigned forces to carry out those actions.
Supporting ^h«=> commander is i-he organizational structure and
the physical means to decide and direct. The command and
control process integrates human behavior, decision making,
and technology to direct the accomplishment of an assigned
mission
.
B. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS MODEL
Functionally the command and control process can be
divided into a series of functions. There are many ways of
grouping theses functions. The JCS definition divides them
according to "planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling". Dr. Joel S. Lawson suggests another division
of functions that is more suited to an analysis of the
nature of command and control (Orr, 1983, p. 24) . Figure 10










Figure 10. Lawson' s C Process Model
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The model consists of the external environment, five
functions, external data, a desired state or goal or the
system, and decision aids.
The external environment refers to all of the activities
and actions outside the control of the command and control
process. These can include the actions of the enemy,
physical and natural phenomena, and the actions of people or
2organizations outside that controlled by the C process.
The external data consists of all the information needed to
help to analyze the sensed data and help make the proper
decision. The desired state is the goal of the command and
control system which is some position or relationship
between the organization and the external environment. And
finally, decision aids refer to the tools, automated or
heuristic, that help to determine the selection of one
course of action over another.
The five functions are: sense, process, compare, decide,
and act. They are described in a military context by Maj.
George Orr, USAF in the following excerpt from his book,
Combat Operations CI: Fundamentals and Interactions :
The SENSE function corresponds to all data-gathering
activities (radar sites, forward observers, photo
reconnaissance systems, and so forth) . It is concerned
with extracting signals from the environment. The
PROCESS function acts upon these signals to attempt to
extract meaning from them. External data, not directly
from the environment, may be used. These may include
intelligence analyses indicating patterns representative
of division headquarters, etc. The PROCESS function
produces event reports and status reports for use by
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later functions. The COMPARE function compares the
state of the environment, as determined by reports from
the process function, with a desired state as specified
by some external source. Based upon this comparison,
the DECIDE function determines what should be done to
move the actual state to the desired state, and the ACT
function executes that decision. (Orr, 1983, p. 24-25)
If these five functions are translated into military
terms, there is not an exact one to one correspondence.
Figure 11 shows a similar functional diagram as Lawson's















Figure 11. Military Command and Control Model
In this model, the functional groupings have been
reduced from five in Lawson's model to four in the military
model. The difference is that the process function, rather
than appearing as a function itself, is split and
incorporated into the intelligence function and the planning
function. In reality the functions have not changed. In
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Lawson's the emphasis is on the action that takes place. In
the military model, the focus is on allocating those
functions to individuals, groups, or communities. The
military model will be the model used throughout the
remainder of this thesis.
C. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM
The JCS definition also recognizes that a commander does
not perform his command and control function in complete
isolation. He is dependent on an organizational structure
or system consisting of personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures through which he
exercises his authority. JCS Pub 1 calls this the "command
and control system" (JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 74) . The command
and control system is the means by which he directs his
forces to accomplish the mission.
Hypothesis 23 : The command and control system is the
means by which a commander directs his forces to
accomplish a mission.
Hypothesis 2 4 : The command and control system consists
of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures
.
The command and control system is a subset of the
overall command and control process. It is a combination of
human and technology means. The specific mix of humans and
technology is dependent on the situation, resources
available, and the technology available. It is divided into
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five distinct and vital elements: personnel, equipment,
communications, facilities, and procedures.
The command and control system can be depicted as a
series of functions (ie., the military model functions)
connected by communications. Figure 12 shows the
representation of one function. As is obvious from the
diagram, each function has some mix of personnel,
procedures, equipment, and facilities. Exactly what that
mix is depends on the function to be performed and the
technology and resources available. Redrawing the military
model using these symbols results in the diagram pictured
in Figure 13.
Since combat is the interaction of two opposing forces,
the battlefield actually has two opposing command and
control systems. Each command and control system is trying
to effectively direct its forces into actions and positions
that will defeat the opposing force. At the same time, each
command and control system is also trying to sense the
capabilities of the opposing force and may even direct
measures to try to degrade the opposing force's command and
control. The sensing is usually called intelligence and the
2 . 3degrading of an opponent's C system is C countermeasures
.
This conflict of two opposing command and control systems is
depicted in Figure 14.
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D. CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
Although th? preceding sections have discussed in great
detail the nature of command and control, the functions are
still too broad to begin to determine how to provide
security for the overall process. This requires an
exploration of actual characteristics of command and










Depending on the application of the command and control
system, these characteristics will appear in varying
degrees . Some command and control systems may have a
minimum required response time of two days. Others, such as
the Strategic Defense Initiative, may require the entire
process to be executed in several seconds or minutes. Some
command and control systems may require secrecy only to the
SECRET level rather than TOP SECRET. Some command and
control systems may require mobility. These systems would
therefore not be able to afford large, heavy, bulky
communication systems and processors. Each command and
control system has its own unique blend of these
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characteristics. Each of these characteristics is




One of the most obvious characteristics of a command
and control system is that it requires connectivity of its
communication systems. As is easily observed in the
previous Figure 14, if the communications between any of the
functions is severed, then the process becomes seriously
degraded if not brought to a complete halt. If the
communications between the intelligence community and the
planning staff is severed, they are forced to formulate
plans without the best, current information. Similarly, if
the communications between the staff and the commander is
destroyed, the commander is left to make a decision without
the analysis of his staff. Finally, if the communication
link between the commander and his forces does not exist,
the commander is powerless and his forces are no longer
under his control.
2 Accuracy
The commander and the forces have placed a
tremendous amount of reliance on the information provided to
them by the command and control system. Accuracy is vital.
Garbled communications can lead to misunderstood commands.
Incomplete staff analysis, inaccurate or inappropriate
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processing algorithms, can all lead to faulty decisions.




The command and control system must be able to
match the pace of changing events in the environment. The
environment imposes the time-line within which decisions are
made and acted upon. The overall time-line must be
apportioned to each command and control function, including
the communication time. If intelligence is received by the
commander after the battle, it is useless. If planning
functions take longer than the allocated time, the commander
may have to make decisions without thorough analysis. If a
commander is unable or unwilling to make decisions within
the time allowed by the environment, opportunities may be
lost by the forces in the field. Timeliness is an important




One of the tenets of command and control states
that the system is the means for a commander to exercise his
authority over assigned forces. It is through the command
and control system that he directs and maintains control.
In contrast to a system where orders are transferred face to
face, authenticity of orders received over radio
communication systems are not as easily verified. Forces
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must respond to valid orders, but how are valid orders
distinguished from an order that appears valid but was sent
by someone other than the commander? The commander also
must be assured that the status reports he receives from his
forces and isolated sensors are authentic representations of
their actual condition. The command and control system
needs to verify that the message received is the message




The command and control system is the means by which
actions and reactions are planned and assigned. This
information can be of vital importance to an adversary.
This includes the sources of intelligence, the options
under consideration, the decisions reached, and the details
of the execution. With this information, the enemy can be
prepared to counter every action. The ability to maintain
secrecy is essential to most command and control systems.
6 Covertness
Often times it is not only necessary to protect the
details of missions or operations, but also the mere
existence or location of forces and sources. In these
circumstances covertness of the command and control system
is of vital importance.
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7 . Availability
Another characteristic of the command and control
system is its availability. This characteristic encompasses
a wide variety of factors. The reliability of the
equipment and personnel is of vital importance. If the
equipment is off line for repairs, or personnel are not at
assigned locations, those functions that the command and
control system is relying on are not "available". There may
be perfect connectivity of the communication system but if
frequencies have not been assigned to the mission,
priorities assigned, or there are differing editions of
cryptographic keys, then the communication system is not
available to support command and control. If vital
analysis support is either destroyed or engaged in other
processing activities then it is not available. It is not
only important to have command and control capabilities,
but also to have it when it is needed.
8 . Affordability
Affordability is more than simply the development
and purchase cost of the command and control system. It
also includes the operating and maintenance costs of the
system, power and processing costs, personnel and training
costs, size and weight costs, the information gathering,
storing, and analyzing costs, the cost of losing it to the
adversary, and the cost of its destruction to the
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effectiveness of the command and control system. Specific
missions may not be able to afford assigning large numbers
of people to operate a command and control system. This
system may require the gathering and storage of large
amounts of information, but that information may not be
effectively stored or processed because of the limitation of
human resources. Another system may so centralize the
command and control function such that its destruction or
disruption may paralyze command and control or its loss to
the enemy would in essence provide him the ability to
control friendly forces. All of these are af fordability
issues in the broadest sense.
Hypothesis 25 : The primary characteristics of a command
and control system are connectivity, accuracy,
timeliness, authenticity, secrecy, covertness,
availability, and af fordability
.
E. THE COMMANDER'S PERCEPTION
The final command and control issue to be addressed
concerns the isolation of the commander from reality.
Modern command and control allows the commander to be
physically removed from the actual battlefield, over the
horizon, or halfway around the world. One advantage of
this is that the commander in a distant command center is
not in imminent danger of being captured. The glaring
disadvantage is that once he is removed from the actual
battlefield, he is totally dependent on his command and
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control system to perceive the battle. The commander no
longer sees actual events but sees a reflection or
representation of the events. All external information is
filtered through his command and control system. This total
dependence on the command and control system provides a
requirement for greater accuracy and authenticity. The
commander must also recognize the errors and biases that can
be introduced to the system and make allowances for them in
his decision process. This leads to the final conclusions
about the nature of command and control
.
Hypothesis 26 : The commander is shown a filtered
representation of the current situation through his
command and control system, not the actual situation.
Hypothesis 27 : Errors and biases can be introduced by the
command and control system.
Hypothesis 28 : The commander is totally reliant on his
command and control system to provide accurate information
and to accurately disseminate his decisions.
*****
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not
fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know
yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you
will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy
nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle. (Sun Tzu,
p. 25) .
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IV. THREATS TO COMMAND AND CONTROL
The Soviets recognize clearly the systemic dependencies
of modern military forces on command, control, and
communications (C ) . As a result, they have developed a
formidable capability to degrade the C assets of enemy
forces. The Soviet doctrine of radioelectronic combat
(REC) includes an integrated program of C
countermeasures using a combination of reconnaissance,
jamming, firepower, and deception to disrupt effective
command and control. REC is integrated into all aspects
of the Soviets' combat operations, displaying their
intention to control the electromagnetic spectrum and
deny it to their enemy. (DOD, 1988, p. 88)
A. WHAT IS A THREAT ?
Just as the need for having common terminology was
important for the previous two chapters concerning the
nature of security and the nature of command and control, it
is equally important to the discussion of threat.
Unfortunately, The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not define the
term "threat". As a substitute, Webster defines threat as:
THREAT - n.
1. an expression of intention to hurt, destroy, punish,
etc., as in intimidation.
2. an indication of imminent danger: as, the threat of
war.
(Webster, 1969, p. 772)
Analyzing this definition, "threat" is seen as a
potential injurious action. Because it is a possible
future action, there is uncertainty whether or not it will
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actually occur and therefore it has an associated
probability of occurrence. This is in contrast to a
"hostile action" that is actually taking place and where
there is no uncertainty about its occurrence. This leads to
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 29 : A threat is a possible, future hostile
or injurious action.
Hypothesis 30 : There is a probability of occurrence
associated with each threat.
Hypothesis 31 : A "hostile act" is the realization of a
threat. It is a threat that is being executed.
There is much emphasis placed within military
intelligence operations on defining all the possible
threats and trying to determine their likelihood of
occurrence. The better the intelligence, the less the
uncertainty, the better the employment of security
measures, and the less damage the threat can cause.
In designing security measures to counter threats,
there are two types of threats that must be considered. The
first is the "potential threat" which is the maximum force
or effort an adversary can expend if he concentrated all of
his resources into this single effort. The second type of
threat is the "probable threat" which takes into account the
fact that there are possibly other priorities for the
adversary and that he will probably not apply all of his
resources in this one effort.
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Hypothe sis 32 : The "potential threat" is the maximum
force or effort an adversary can expend if all of his
resources were applied to this single effort to breach
security measures
.
Hypothesis 33 : The "probable threat" is an estimate of
the most likely levels of force an adversary will expend
in his effort to breach the security measures.
What level of threat should the system be designed to
resist? Ideally, a system should be designed against all
possible "potential" threats. Unfortunately, the cost of
this method is often exorbitantly high. Because of
constrained resources, security is often designed to a
"probable threat" level or at least some threat level less
than 100%. If the adversary actually exerts a force greater
than the designed security level, then security can be
breached. This difference between the designed security
level and the security level required to repel the full
potential threat is called a vulnerability.
B. VULNERABILITY
While the JCS do not have a definition for "threat",
they do define the word "vulnerability". The following is
the JCS definition:
VULNERABILITY -
1. The susceptibility of a nation or military force to
any action by any means through which its war potential
or combat effectiveness may be reduced or its will to
fight diminished.
59
2. The characteristics of a system which causes it to
suffer a definite degradation (incapability to perform
the designated mission) as a result of having been
subjected to a certain level of effects in an unnatural
(manmade) hostile environment.
(JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 367)
In this definition, the JCS define a vulnerability as a
characteristic of the object or system. When this
characteristic is exposed to an outside hostile force or
action, the consequence is a decrease in the effectiveness
or value of the object being protected. The vulnerability
can then be considered any characteristic that will allow a
hostile action to degrade the system.
Since security measures are system design
characteristics that prevent a hostile action from affecting
the system, there is an unmistakable relationship between
security measures and vulnerabilities as was previously
discussed in Chapter II.
In essence, what that discussion described was a
security process. The input to the system is a hostile
action that was some percentage of the maximum threat level.
The security measures are designed to repel a specific
level of the potential threat, and the vulnerability is
the percentage difference between the potential threat and
the applied security measures. The consequence of this
interaction between the hostile action and the security
measure is a degradation of the value of the protected item.
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The "security process" transforms the hostile action into a
percentage change of the value of the protected item.
Hypothesis 34 : A vulnerability is the lack of adequate
security measures to protect against potential threats.
C. EXAMPLE OF THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES
The following example may help to explain further the
concepts of threat and vulnerability. A hypothetical
gymnasium roof was designed to hold 20,000 lbs. of snow
weight. During the night, a record level of snow fell with
25,000 lbs. accumulating on the roof. The structural
members of the gym buckled and the roof collapsed. In this
example the interlocking architectural structure was the
security system. The protected item was the interior of the
gym and the value measure was the amount of snow allowed in
the interior of the gym.
The architect assumed the maximum load the roof would
have to hold was below 20,000 lbs. The roof was therefore
designed with a built in vulnerability to any weights over
the design maximum 20,000 lbs. Figure 15a shows the assumed
probability distribution of snow weight. Implied in this
distribution is the assumption that the probability of a
threat greater than 20,000 lbs. was zero. Clearly in this
example, the maximum potential threat was not 20,000 lbs.
but at least 25,000 lbs. Figure 15b shows a new







































Figure 15. Snowfall Threat Probability Distributions
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threat. The vulnerability level is shaded. If the 25,000
lbs is used as the estimate of the 100% potential threat
level, then the following calculations can be made:
Potential Threat = 25,000 lbs. = 100% Threat
Security Level = 20,000 lbs. = 80% Threat
Vulnerability Level = 5,000 lbs. = 20%
A probable threat in this example would be an assumed
"most likely" snow fall. This could correspond to the
normal or average snowfall which would be some level less
than the maximum 25,000 lbs. On the probability
distribution, the normal snowfall would be the mean of the
distribution and the probability of its occurrence would be
50% (the area under the curve less than or equal to the
mean)
.
A more realistic view of this problem would be to view
the potential threat as a continuous infinite probability
distribution with an ever decreasing probability of
occurrence. Figure 15c shows this type of distribution.
There is always a possibility that the threat level is
higher than whatever level is assumed, but its probability
becomes much less as the threat level increases. In this
case, the security level and the probable threat levels can
be established, but the potential threat and vulnerability
levels are theoretically infinite. If a confidence level is
established, then calculations can be computed from the
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assumed potential threat level. For instance, if 25,000
lbs. is again established as the potential threat, but with
a 99% confidence level (the area under the curve less than
or equal to 25,000 lbs.) instead of 100%, the calculations
for the security level, probable threat, and vulnerability
would remain the same as in the second distribution. The
architect would only be 99% confident of his estimate
though. At least he would recognize the possibility of a
threat greater than his designed security level. The system
could then be designed with an agreed upon maximum
vulnerability level, in this case, 1%.
Hypothesis 35 : Vulnerabilities are inherent
characteristics of a design.
Hypothesis 36 : A system designer does not have control
over the threat.
Hypothesis 37 : A system designer does have control over
the design vulnerabilities through the design security
level
.
These conclusions imply that if a system is to be
designed properly to operate within its environment, the
threat to the system must be identified. And in order to
design a secure system, the security level must be set to
exceed the level of the potential threat
.
It is also apparent from the previous example, that
good information about the potential threat and the
probable threat is important. Unfortunately that
information is often not accurate, not current, incomplete,
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and, especially if the adversary is trying to operate
secretly and covertly, difficult to obtain. Security
designers are therefore faced with the task of trying to
design a security system to withstand assumed threat levels.
How well those estimates are made can be a fundamental
factor in the outcome of a hostile action.
D. THREAT MOTIVATION
In designing a security system with limited resources,
two fundamentally different types of threat must be
considered. The first type of threat is the natural or
environmental threat such as snowfall, floods, weather,
seasons, physical laws, and natural radiation. The second
type of threat is manmade. This includes theft, robbery,
assault, and murder in society and jamming, espionage,
bombardment, and nuclear attack on the battlefield.
In order to design safeguards against the first, an
understanding of the environmental conditions and processes
is required. To design effectively against the second type
requires an understanding of the motivation of the
adversary. Is the adversary's purpose to disrupt or to
halt an operation? The force level required to disrupt may
be much less than that required to halt an operation and
security measures designed to protect against one may be
totally useless against the other. Unless there are enough
resources to protect against both, an evaluation of the
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motive and therefore the most likely methods become a
necessity
.
E. THE PROTECTED ITEMS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
To analyze the security of command and control systems
2it is helpful to translate the C system into a series of
security processes. The protected items in this case are
the eight primary characteristics of a command and control
system: connectivity, accuracy, timeliness, authenticity,
secrecy, covertness, availability, and affordability . These
represent the real goals of an adversary in attacking a
command and control system. His hope is that by degrading
or destroying these traits in the system, he can prevent the
successful execution and coordination of the mission.
The value measurement level for each of these
characteristics is different. Conceptually they can be
considered as follows:
1. Connectivity : The percentage of the original
communication capability that is available to
transmit command and control messages.
2. Accuracy : The percent of accurate information that
is transmitted or stored in the system.
3. Timeliness : The percent of operations and messages
that are performed within their allocated portion of
time to respond.
4. Authenticity : The percent of messages and orders
that can correctly be determined to have come from




5. Secrecy : The percent of operational information that
is unknown to the adversary.
6. Covertness : The percent of the operation's existence
and location that is unknown to the adversary.
7. Availability : The percent of the required command
and control resources (communications, personnel,
equipment, and facilities) that are available at the
required times.
8. Affordability : The percent of total required
resources available to execute, operate, and maintain
the operation.
The security measures applied to command and control
systems will be discussed in the next chapter. This
chapter will now focus on the nature of the threat to
command and control
.
F. TWO COMMAND AND CONTROL THREAT MOTIVATIONS
There are two major threat motivations affecting
command and control. The first is an adversary's desire to
gain information about the operation or mission. This is
an intelligence threat to command and control. Because of
the wealth of information transmitted between and stored
2
within the personnel and equipment of a C system, it is a
prime intelligence target.
The second major motivation is to disrupt or destroy the
command and control system from performing its decision
leaking and force direction function. This is a C
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counter-measure (C 3 CM)
-
1 threat (Littlebury, 1986, p. 33).
s •mce the command and control system is the means by which a
commander directs his forces to accomplish the mission,
degradation or destruction of this system can paralyze the
forces without the need for destroying the firepower.
These two major motivations by an adversary to exploit
command and control lead to very different threats. Figure
16 shows a tree of potential command and control threats
and Figure 17 shows a matrix of which command and control
characteristics these intelligence and countermeasure
threats can affect.
The emphasis the adversary places on each motivation can
also change during different phases of war. During
peacetime or heightened tensions, the intelligence
motivation may be of prime concern with very little actual
motivation to disrupt U.S. command and control. During the
first stages of actual war, the predominance shifts to
disrupting or destroying command and control in order for an
adversary to execute his operations with as little
resistance as possible. In later phases of war, a balance
is struck between the need for information about the enemy
and the need to decrease the potency of the opposing
1 2Although throughout this thesis C has been
emphasized, the most commonly used term for this threat is
C CM. Rather than develop a new term to maintain internal
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OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE X X X
IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE X X X
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE X X X
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE X X X
DESTRUCTIVE FORCE X X X X X
DISRUPTION AND DELAY X X X X X
CONFUSION AND DECEPTION X X X X
USURPATION X X
INTERNAL C^CM X X X X X X X
1
X
Figure 17. C Threats vs. Characteristics Matrix
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forces. Different security measures are required to defeat
each class of motivational threats.
G. INTELLIGENCE THREATS TO COMMAND AND CONTROL
Intelligence threats to command and control involve a
whole class of actions by an adversary to determine the
nature, capabilities, and intentions of an opposing force.
The JCS define intelligence as:
INTELLIGENCE - The product resulting from the
collection, processing, integration, analysis,
evaluation, and interpretation of available information
concerning foreign countries or area. (JCS Pub 1, 1979,
p. 177)
Intelligence can be gathered in a variety of ways from a
command and control system. These include: Open Source
Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) , Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) , and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
.
The primary purpose of intelligence is to gain a better
understanding of the environment and an adversary, thereby
reducing the level of uncertainty on the battlefield. It
allows commanders to anticipate an adversary' s actions and





Open source intelligence comprises three different
collection activities: collection of legally available
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documents; open observation of foreign political, military,
or economic activity; and the monitoring and recording of
public radio and television broadcasts (Richelson, 1985,
p. 173). Although open source intelligence deals primarily
with sources other than a military command and control
system, there are still open source threats to command and
control
.
One open source intelligence threat against command
and control systems concerns the broadcast and publishing of
command and control information by reporters and
journalists. Their information may come from leaks to the
press by political or military leaders, inadvertent
statements of command and control information to the press
or in open forums by informed individuals, or through
conclusions drawn by reporters and journalists observing the
military operation. Once in the public medium, this
information is readily available for use by an adversary.
Because all of this information was collected within the
public domain, its collection and reporting is not illegal,
however it can be just as damaging to an operation as
covertly collected information. The press in this instance
is like a "public" intelligence collecting and reporting
agency
.
The observations and hearing of public comments do
not necessarily have to be restricted to reporters. Any
operation in public view or statements made in public can be
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picked up and relayed to an adversary for his use and
analysis. This may be through informing the media, or it
may be through direct or indirect communications with an
adversary
.
The information transferred may be the existence of
an operation, the location, the time of movement, the
strength or capabilities of the operational force, or even
speculation on the actual mission itself. All of this
command and control information can be damaging when in the
hands of an adversary. Thus security of command and
control systems must take into account the possibility of
open source intelligence and take the necessary safeguards
to protect itself.
2 . Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
Imagery intelligence is the collection of "pictures"
of a region or item of interest and the analysis of those
images for information. Although the word "picture" was
used, imagery intelligence coveys more than just
conventional photographs using the visual spectrum. It can
include infra-red images or even radar images. Whatever the
actual medium or spectrum that is used, the objective of
IMINT is to obtain useful information from the analysis of
images. Photographic intelligence is one aspect of IMINT
focusing on the visual spectrum. The JCS defines
photographic intelligence as:
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PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE - The collected products of
photographic interpretation, classified and evaluated
for intelligence use. (JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 259)
In essence it is the use of visual images and pictures to
provide information about an adversary.
IMINT can provide evidence of an operation, a
force's location, the size, nature, and location of command
centers, and, over time, provide an indication of increases
or decreases in operations or movement. It can provide
evidence of physical presence, noticeable physical
characteristics, location, and orientation. These are all
useful pieces of information for an adversary.
Since command and control systems utilize sensors,
command centers, and antennas, their physical observation
can provide information to the adversary. Therefore, if the
operation is to be covert, physical observation of the
command and control system must be reduced to an absolute
minimum.
3 . Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
As was previously mentioned, there is a wealth of
critical information residing within the command and control
system. While good design and operation of a command and
control system can reduce the amount of electromagnetic
information an adversary can extract from the system, there
are still the human elements of the system that pass in and
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out of the secure boundaries of the system. These personnel
retain a tremendous amount of the information in the command
and control system within their memories when operating
outside the confines of the system. This is opposed to the
memory of command and control computer systems that may have
severe restrictions and controls placed on them if they were
to leave the command and control system for use elsewhere or
for maintenance. It is because the personnel in the system
acquire tremendous amounts of information that human
intelligence is a serious potential threat to command and
control
.
One type of human intelligence that is used is the
recruiting of individuals already within the command and
control system. John Walker and Jerry Whitworth are prime
examples of this type of human intelligence. They both had
already passed the screening process and were afforded
access to sensitive cryptographic information.
Another type of human intelligence is the actual
penetration of a command and control organization by spies
of the adversary. This may include break-ins to collect
information or the planting of informants within the
organization to obtain information from individuals,
communications, or computer systems within the secured
facilities. Although there is tremendous risk involved in
these operations to an adversary, a success can provide a
rich dividend of command and control information.
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A third type of human intelligence is actually a
combination of human and signals intelligence. This
involves the planting of transmitting devices within the
facilities or equipment of the command and control system.
This implantation could occur within the facilities itself
or during transportation and maintenance of equipment.
Rather than waiting for the information to be transmitted or
radiated, the adversary provides the transmission medium.
Once implanted, the threat then becomes an enhanced signals
intelligence threat.
4 . Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
Modern command and control systems are depending
more and more on electronic equipment to obtain the
required processing, storage, speed, and communication
distances. Each electronic system emits its own type of
electromagnetic radiation, both intended and secondary.
Communication systems utilize the properties of
electromagnetic fields and waves to transmit information
over the horizon. Those electromagnetic waves are available
not only to the intended receiver but to anyone, including
an adversary, in a proper location to receive that
radiation. Similarly the secondary radiation such as side
lobes from antenna configurations or general radiation
emission from electronic equipment can also reveal
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information to an adversary if they are properly positioned
to receive that radiation.
Signals intelligence includes many different aspects
of collecting information from an adversary's
electromagnetic radiations. The following is the JCS
definition of signals intelligence:
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE - A category of intelligence
information comprising all communication intelligence,
electronic intelligence, and telemetry intelligence.
(JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 314)
a. Communication Intelligence (COMINT)
Communication intelligence, as its name
implies, is the derivation of information from an
adversary's communications. This includes the monitoring of
an adversary's un-encrypted communications, deciphering its
encrypted communications, and analyzing the amount
communication traffic.
The easiest form of communication intelligence
is the simple monitoring of the unprotected conversations
and messages that are transmitted through the
electromagnetic ether. Once the proper frequencies and
modes of transmission are determined, an adversary can
listen and understand the transmitted command and control
information at the same time as the intended recipient. An
adversary can receive a tremendous amount of information
from monitoring "clear" communications.
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Once the communication systems are encrypted,
the contents of a conversation or message are much more
difficult to obtain. This requires either breaking the
encryption system used, or stealing the cryptographic
equipment and cryptographic key being used. Cryptanalysis
requires the expenditure of tremendous resources and can be
time consuming. The British and American effort to break
the German ENIGMA code in World War II is a testimony to the
difficulty of this process (Kozacuk, 1984).
The stealing of cryptographic equipment and code
is another method. This, like human intelligence is risky
but can provide tremendous amounts of information. Walker
and Whitworth are an example of this type of threat and the
damage it can cause. The threat is not only to current
communications, but the theft of cryptographic key may also
allow an adversary the capability to read previously
recorded encrypted traffic and collect command and control
information from those messages as well.
The damage of stolen cryptographic key is
further enhanced by the assumption by users that the
encrypted communication systems are still secure. Under
those circumstances a user would still be willing to
transmit very sensitive command and control information. If
that same user had only a known, unsecured communication
path, he would be more cautious about the information
transmitted.
78
Even if a communicated encrypted message is not
deciphered, there is still information that can be obtained
from communications. Traffic analysis studies the amount of
traffic that is transmitted and where that information is
being sent. An increase or decrease in message traffic or
traffic routing can indicate a change in the operation to an
analyst
.
Call signs, frequencies, and other operator
signatures are also indicators of the identity of a
transmitting unit. Even the transmission itself can reveal
the existence and location of a unit. There is a tremendous
amount of information that can be derived from
communication intelligence.
b. Electronic Intelligence (ELINT)
The derivation of information from
electromagnetic signals other than communication signals is
called electronic intelligence. This type of radiation
includes radar, beacons, and the telemetry from satellites
and weapons. The JCS define electronic intelligence as:
ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE - Technical and intelligence
information derived from foreign, non-communications,
electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than
nuclear detonations or radioactive sources. (JCS Pub 1,
1979, p. 121)
The first aspect of electronic intelligence is
simply the detection of a signal. Its mere presence is
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information that something is out there that needs to be
investigated further to determine if it is hostile. This is
a detection threat.
Another aspect of electronic intelligence is
the monitoring of all electronic emissions from an
adversary to try to determine the nature of the source from
the frequency and characteristics of the signal. One radar
system associated with an anti-aircraft unit may have an
entirely different electronic signature from a command and
control center. There also may be subtle differences that
can be detected between similar type equipment. By studying
these emissions, an analyst may be able to determine the
type and nature of units they are opposing. This also
applies to the telemetry of satellites and weapon systems.
By understanding the signals, an analyst can often draw
conclusions about the characteristics of the satellite or
weapon system. This is sometimes called telemetry
intelligence (TELINT)
.
A third aspect of electronic intelligence
attempts to determine the precise bearing, or, using two or
more bearings, the precise location of the source of an
emission. This is called direction finding or location
finding. The JCS define direction finding as:
DIRECTION FINDING - A procedure for obtaining bearings
of radio frequency emitters with the use of a highly
directional antenna and a display unit on an intercept
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receiver of ancillary equipment. (JCS Pub 1, 1979,
p. 110)
If an adversary knows that a signal exists, its
location, and its composition, then countermeasures can be
employed against that source. And if that source is a
critical command and control element, the countermeasures
may seriously disrupt or destroy effective command and
control. Whenever ELINT is determined to be a serious
threat, security measures should be applied to lessen or
eliminate the impact of the threat on the command and
control system.
A final area of electronic intelligence concerns
the secondary radiation of electronic equipment into its
immediate environment. Although the radiation level is
quite small in comparison with communication system or radar
emissions, information may be passed for relatively short
distances by this secondary radiation (Hsiao, 1979, p. 99).
If an adversary is able to receive and record these signals,
information that was assumed to be protected may actually be
within the hands of the adversary.
H. COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATION COUNTERMEASURES
Unlike the intelligence threat that welcomes the open
use of command and control systems so that it can obtain
critical information, the command, control, and
communication countermeasure (C CM) threat seeks to
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interfere with the command and control process. The overall
objectives of C CM are listed below:
1
.
Destroy - To destroy or render useless an
adversary's communication system or command and
control functions
.
2. Disrupt - To disrupt an adversary's communication
system or command and control functions to the point
where they are no longer considered reliable.
3. Delay - To delay an adversary's communications,
processing, or execution of command and control
functions to the point where the command and control
system can no longer respond within the required
time frame.
4. Deceive - To deceive an adversary's sensors or
personnel into believing the environment is
different than what actually exists.
5. Confuse - To confuse automatic and human decision
making processes to the point where appropriate
decisions are no longer reliably made.
6. Usurp - To usurp control of an adversary's command
and control process allowing for direction of his
forces
.
These objectives are not mutually exclusive of one
another and can be executed in a partial fashion. For
example, if an adversary were to know the proper telemetry
signals controlling a communication satellite, he would then
possess the ability to usurp control of that satellite. By
then moving the satellite in its orbit or directing a
reorientation of its antenna, the adversary will then be
able to cause a certain amount of disruption , delay , and
confusion in the transmission of command and control
information. Assuming that there are redundant
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communication paths, after a period of time, all users would
realize that this one communication path was no longer
available and switch to another. If there were not
redundant paths, this same action could destroy the only
communication path.
Another example would be an adversary covertly usurping
control of an isolated radar site. If this action were
truly covert and the status feedback messages to the
controlling site did not register any change in status of
the radar, then the adversary could use that radar site to
send false information, and deceive his enemy.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff first define a broader
category of "countermeasures" and then define a subcategory
of "electronic warfare". These are restated below:
COUNTERMEASURES - That form of military science which by
the employment of devices and/or techniques has as its
objective the impairment of the operational
effectiveness of enemy activity. (JCS Pub 1, 1979,
p. 91) .
ELECTRONIC WARFARE - Military action involving the use
of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce,
or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum
and action which retains friendly use of the
electromagnetic spectrum. Also called EW. There are
three divisions within electronic warfare:
a. electronic warfare support measures - That
division of electronic warfare involving actions taken
under direct control of an operational commander to
search for, intercept, and identify/locate sources of
radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of
immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare
support measures provide a source of information
required for immediate decisions involving electronic
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countermeasures, electronic counter-countermeasures,
avoidance, targeting, and other tactical employment of
forces. Also called ESM.
b. electronic countermeasures - That division of
electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or
reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic
spectrum. Also called ECM. Electronic countermeasures
include
:
(1) electronic jamming - The deliberate
radiation, re-radiation, or reflection of
electromagnetic energy with the object of impairing the
use of electronic devices, equipment, or systems being
used by an enemy. Also called jamming.
(2) electronic deception - The deliberate
radiation, re-radiation, alteration, absorption, or
reflection of electromagnetic energy in a manner
intended to mislead an enemy in the interpretation or
use of information received by the enemy's electronic
systems
. There are two categories of electronic
deception: (a) manipulative electronic deception - The
alteration or simulation of friendly electromagnetic
radiations to accomplish deception. (b) imitative
electronic deception - The introduction of radiations
into enemy systems which imitate the enemy's emissions.
c. electronic counter-countermeasures - That division
of electronic warfare involving actions taken to retain
effective friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Also called ECCM. (JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 121)
3Electronic warfare is a major aspect of C CM but it
does not encompass the non-electromagnetic aspects of the
command and control process. A more comprehensive
definition is found in the Armed Forces Communications and
3Electronics Association (AFCEA) book Invisible Combat: C CM
3
- A Guide for the Tactical Commander. They define C CM as:
Command, control and communication countermeasures
(C CM) is the integrated use of physical destruction,
electronic warfare (EW) , operations security (OPSEC)
,
and military deception; all supported by intelligence,
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-3
with a two-fold intent - one, degradation of enemy C
,
and two, protection of friendly C from enemy
degradation. (Littlebury, 1986, p. 33)
One last definition that requires study is the Soviet
Union's doctrine of radioelectronic combat (REC) . REC is
the electronic portion of "maskirovka" which is an overall
military and political "masking" of true intentions and
deception (DOD, 1988, p. 88). Radioelectronic combat is
integrated into all aspects of the Soviet's military
operation and consists of countermeasures using a
combination of reconnaissance, jamming, firepower, and
deception to disrupt enemy command and control (DOD, 1988,
p. 88). The Soviet definition encompasses all of the U.S.
definition of electronic warfare and adds the firepower used
to destroy communication nodes and command and control
elements, plus other non-electromagnetic means to deceive
and disrupt command and control. This includes the use of
27,000 to 30,000 personnel in the GRU (a Soviet military
intelligence organization) special forces known as Spetznaz
to operate behind enemy lines, neutralizing command centers,
staffs, and lines of communications (Richelson, 1986, p.
162) .
From the preceding discussions, it is apparent that the
threat to command and control encompasses more than
"electronic warfare". C CM also takes into account the
applied destructive firepower, sabotage, actions against
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command and control personnel, and the introduction of
errors. The following sections will describe the following
broad C CM motivations: Destructive Force, Disruption and
Delay, Confusion and Deception, Usurpation, and Internal
C 3CM.
1 . Destructive Force
a. Conventional Weapons
This is the most familiar threat in a military
conflict--the application of destructive firepower on a
specific target. Artillery fire, aircraft bombardment, and
targeted missiles are just a portion of the conventional
arsenal of weapons that can be used to destroy critical
command and control nodes. This type of threat assumes that
by destroying the communication systems and critical command
and control operations, the means to direct and manage
forces will also be destroyed. The destructive force can be
applied to communication medium (i.e., telephone cable),
their communication centers, antenna, relay points, or
satellites. The destructive force can also be applied to
the personnel, equipment, and facilities of each command and
control function. This would include the sensors,
intelligence and analysis centers, command centers, or the
forces themselves.
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b. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons
Conventional weapons are not the only potential
threat source. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
can also be employed for the destruction of command and
control elements. Nuclear weapons can destroy command and
control functions not only through their massive destructive
capability, but also through the electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
and radiation released during detonation (Carter, 1987, pp.
273 - 278) . Humans in the command and control system can
be seriously affected by the radiation released (L. Martin,
1987, p. 98) and electronic equipment can be damaged by both
the radiation and EMP (Carter, 1987, p. 277) . Just as
devastating to the human element of command and control are
chemical and biological weapons.
c. Special Forces
As was previously discussed, sabotage can also
effectively destroy command and control capabilities. One
of the primary goals of the Soviet Union's Spetznaz forces
are the destruction of command and control facilities
(Richelson, 1986, p. 162). Sabotage can also be conducted
by internal opposition groups, traitors, or spies.
d. Software Warfare
Sabotage can include more than the planting of
explosive forces. One potentially menacing form of sabotage
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is "software warfare" (Boorman, 1988, p. 76) . Software
warfare is the deliberate modification or insertion of
computer software code to cause adverse operations of the
computer. Several categories of software warfare include
"trojan horses", "logic bombs", "algorithm sabotage",
"worms" and "viruses".
Trojan horses are lines of code surreptitiously
included in valid code. This code may cause computer
systems to shut down, erase files, or perform endless
calculations such as computing the square root of two. A
"logic bomb" is one form of trojan horse that remains
inactive and undetected until a particular date or set of
conditions occur (Boorman, 1988, p. 76) . A logic bomb
rendered several internal records of the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power useless for a week by creating
a denial-of-access condition (Boorman, 1988, p. 76)
.
Algorithm sabotage is not the insertion of
erroneous lines of code, but instead alters the underlying
algorithm from which the code is later developed. During
the Falkland War, the British Sea Wolf missile's guidance
algorithm was not provided instructions on how to respond to
two enemy aircraft attacking on parallel courses. Unable to
resolve the priority of targets, the software shut the
system down (Boorman, 1988, p. 77) . Other oversights in
the underlying algorithm of the software of command and
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control systems may prevent the use of computers at critical
moments
.
Computer worms and viruses are programs that can
regenerate themselves and in the process use up tremendous
processing time. A worm is a self contained program that,
once activated, will continue to replicate itself, often
destroying files of data, and with the ability to be
transferred over computer networks. On November 2, 1988, a
computer worm was released from Cornell University into the
Defense Data Network (DDN) . For two days the worm infected
the computers across the United States that were attached to
the DDN. The result was a curtailment or a serious
degradation in processing of authentic programs during that
period of time. (Buzzard, 1988)
Viruses are programs that are attached to a host
program and, like worms, are able to regenerate themselves
and destroy data files. Viruses are spread by the sharing
of software disks or the transfer of infected programs over
a network. Once a virus is resident within a host, it can
attach itself to all other programs through the disk
operating system. (TIME, 1988, p. 63)
.
Software warfare or sabotage does not have to
occur on the battlefield itself, but can be performed during
the writing, development, or installation of the code into
command and control equipment (Boorman, 1988, p. 78) and can
be spread to several locations from a single attack.
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Because of the reliance of modern command and control
equipment on software, software warfare must be considered a
serious threat.
2 . Disruption and Delay
a. Incomplete Destruction
If total destruction is not possible or
desirable, an adversary may desire to disrupt or delay the
command and control elements. Incomplete destruction is one
method of achieving disruption and delay. It will require
time to reorganize and reconstruct the command and control
network. Disruption and delay can also be achieved by
attacking antenna and power sources
.
b. Jamming
An effective disruption technique is electronic
jamming. This technique attempts to place a sufficient
amount of energy over the frequencies used by sensors and
communication systems so that the receiver is unable to
discriminate the true signal. The following paragraph from
the Soviet book Fundamentals of Command and Control shows
that the Soviet Union considers jamming to be an effective
C 3CM technique:
Today jamming is considered one of the chief methods of
disrupting the operation of enemy electronic equipment.
It is capable for a certain period of time of depriving
the enemy of the opportunity to receive and transmit
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information over electronic equipment, or it can
significantly reduce the audibility and visibility of
the signals, deceive the operators, and cause errors in
the operation of automated communication devices
.
(Ivanov, 1977, p. 268 )
c. Message Flooding
Another form of jamming is the flooding of
communication paths with bogus or recorded messages. This
can strain the capacity of communication systems while at
the same time create queues for automatic message processing
systems as they try to sort out the current valid messages
from the bogus ones.
3. Confusion and Deception
Confusion and deception require more information
about sensors, analysis methods, and use of the processed
information than the preceding threats. Camouflage,
decoys, simulation of "friendly" signals, emitting
electronic signatures of different units or weapon systems,
and maneuver techniques are all capable of providing
misleading information to the enemy. The hope is that
through these actions, the adversary will make erroneous
conclusions about the nature or location of the threat which
will allow for future exploitation. But in order to
effectively utilize these deception techniques, a good
understanding of how the adversary collects and utilizes
this information is vital. If an aircraft is to masquerade
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as a "friendly" aircraft, it must be able to reproduce the
radar signature and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
signal of the friendly aircraft. In order for stealth
technology to be effective, knowledge of enemy radar
capabilities is required. Deception requires an
understanding of the adversary and his methods of operation.
Another method of causing confusion and deception is
by modifying current or previous messages and broadcasting
those changes. Not only will this cause confusion over the
validity of the message and whether the new or previous
message were correct, but will also cause a delay in an
adversary's action until the confusion is resolved.
4 . Usurpation
Usurpation of control is the actual control of
friendly forces, sensors, and weapons by enemy forces. The
modern battlefield requires forces, weapons, and sensors to
be located over vast distances with the communication
systems being the only connection between these command and
control elements. If an adversary were to be able to send
valid appearing messages over those command and control
communication systems, the receiving weapon or unit would
respond as if they had received an authentic message. Any
communication system without an authentication technique is
vulnerable to manipulation and usurpation of control. Even
with authentication methods applied, communication systems
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still must protect those authentication devices from
compromise or again the system is subject to exploitation.
5. Internal C 3CM
3The final category of C CM is not a threat by an
adversary on friendly command and control, but what friendly
forces can do to themselves. Using improper frequencies,
improper cryptographic keys and settings, and equipment that
is not interoperable can prevent the transfer of vital
command and control information as effectively as enemy
jamming. Complete planning, coordination, and training of
how command and control equipment will be utilized is
crucial in preventing incompatibility from destroying the
command and control process.
Similarly improper use of systems designed to
protect against enemy countermeasures can render the
protective measures useless. Excessive use of the radio,
predicable call signs and procedures, and identifying
characteristics of operators are all operation errors that
degrade the protective character of command and control
systems (Ivanov, 1977, p. 269) . Just as much emphasis
should be placed on eliminating poor planning, coordination,
and operation of command and control systems as in
preventing an adversary from exploiting it.
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V. SECURITY MEASURES
A. REVIEW OF SECURITY THEORY
As was discussed in Chapter II, security measures are
the means by which the impact of a hostile action is
minimized to retain the greatest remaining value of the
protected item. Unfortunately there is not one security
measure for each threat to command and control . Security is
really a system of security measures working together to
provide the required protection (see previous Figure 6)
.
Chapter II also identified two major categories of
security measures which were shown previously in Figure 7
.
These two classes were passive or boundary security measures
and active security measures. The passive security measures
serve to create a secure operating environment for the
protected item to work within. By restricting the operating
environment, there is less area that must be secured and
therefore other security measures can be applied with
greater concentration. The active security measures
monitored and controlled access through the barriers.
B. OPERATIVE SECURITY PRINCIPLES




1. Discourage Hostile Actions (Deterrence).
2. Prevent Successful Hostile Actions (Prevention)
.




Discouragement of a hostile action is often
referred to as deterrence and can be thought of as a
counter-threat. Nuclear deterrence is a good example of
this type of security. Although the Soviet Union possesses
significant nuclear capability to threaten the existence of
the United States' society, the U.S. also possesses an
adequate amount of nuclear retaliation capability to inflict
heavy enough damage on the Soviet Union to discourage their
converting their nuclear threat into a hostile action
(Blair, 1985, p. 16). Three important ingredients of
deterrence are: a good probability of detecting an
attempted hostile action; making the cost of a successful
hostile action costly in resources to the adversary; and
finally, making the penalty or retaliation high enough and
reliable enough so that the expected penalty is greater than




Prevention of a hostile action can be accomplished
by attacking the threatening forces (preemptive strikes) or
by constructing defenses greater than the opposing hostile
action. Jamming of an enemy's anti-aircraft radar can be
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considered an offensive form of providing security for the
friendly attacking aircraft. A field of land mines can be
an effective defense against enemy personnel.
3 . Minimize Impact
The final principle of security is minimizing the
impact of a successful hostile action. If communication
systems are established in a network fashion rather than in
a serial fashion, the network will continue to operate even
with the destruction of one or more nodes or circuits
.
Redundancy is one application of this principle. Another
application of this principle is the concept of "security in
depth". Security in depth applies several different
security measures simultaneously to counter threats. If one
security measure fails, others will be available to catch
the remaining hostile action. The several different levels
of the Strategic Defense Initiative are an example of
security in depth. "Don't put all your eggs in one basket"
is another way of describing this principle. Dispersal of
resources such as antennas will prevent one attack from
destroying all antennas.
C. TYPES OF SECURITY MEASURES
There are thousands of types of security measures
available to add to the level of security. Doors and walls,
fences and gates, patrols, alarms, locks, and identification
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devices are all types of security measures. In addition to
the variety of types, there are many variations of methods
and quality within each type. For instance, each type of
padlock, door lock, or cipherlock operates in a slightly
different fashion. Rather than trying to describe each type
of security measure currently available, the remainder of
this chapter will provide an overview of various classes of
security measures. Figure 18 shows the types of command and
control security measures.
To repeat what was discussed in the last chapter, there
is not a one to one correspondence between threat and
security measures. In other words, there is not one
security measure by itself that can prevent a hostile
action. Security measures must be applied as a cohesive
system in order to be effective.
Assume, for instance, a valuable jewel necklace is
placed in a hotel vault for safe keeping. The vault can be
considered a physical security measure creating a secure
environment for the necklace. Even with the radical
assumption that the vault is impenetrable once locked, the
necklace is still not entirely safe. There is a combination
to the vault that allows access to the interior. This is a
cryptographic security measure . If an adversary can steal
or determine the combination of the vault, he would be free
to steal the necklace. The combination to the vault must

















































































































W Eh CS63 8 Eh>H CO > 2
Eh
hH MM hH % OO
cs o hH.3 CJ Q 2o < 2 Cm C
63 5 3 CO
CO e- o I CS





12 s: o hm Cm o2 HH <c O OS SQ M Cm 6m Cm Eh
5q
I











HT3 CO Eho CO bd 2
63 CS O 63





























If individuals know the combination, security measures
must be taken to assure that these individuals will not use,
or allow to be used, that special knowledge to steal the
necklace. This then involves personnel security measures
and procedural security measures .
By just concentrating on the security of the necklace,
one important threat may be overlooked, the theft of the
vault itself. A adversary may not even attempt to break
into the vault at its present location. If the vault itself
is not secure, the adversary may simply carry it away and
work to open it in a location comfortable to him. Security
is the result of a system of security measures working
together to provide protection.
1
. Physical Security
Physical security measures are security devices that
create a physical area or environment that is free from
unwanted access. Usually this area is relatively small. It
can be the confines of a box containing a single integrated
chip, the housing of a larger piece of equipment, a room, a
building, a base or post, or even a sector of a battlefield.
The JCS define physical security as :
PHYSICAL SECURITY - That part of security concerned with
physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to
prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities,
material, and documents, and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JCS Pub 1,
1979, p. 260)
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Walls, fences, and screens are all examples of
passive physical security measures that create a boundary
around the safe environment. Patrols, alarms, inspection
stations, guard posts, and gates are examples of active
security measures controlling the flow of people and
equipment through the passive boundaries. In a public
airport, the walls of the terminal and the fences
surrounding the runway form the passive physical boundaries.
Without active physical security measures, these passive
measures could eventually be overcome. The active physical
security measures assure the integrity of the passive
measures and control the flow of passengers, luggage, and
equipment into the secure environment. As was previously
discussed, active measures involve detection, response, and
penalty mechanisms. In this case, the metal detectors at
the entrance to each terminal are one detection device; the
response is the airport security force; and the penalty is
inconvenience of being more closely inspected, missing the
flight, or if the offense were serious enough, arrest,
trial, and fine or imprisonment.
There are several techniques available to help to
improve the security access problem. In order to help
protect combinations from being compromised, split-knowledge
combinations can be used. Two people, each with a different
part of the combination, are then required in order to open
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the lock. Many safe deposit boxes operate on this same
principle with two separate keys.
Many different identification techniques are also
being used. In addition to the standard identification card
or badge an authorized individual must carry, some also
contain a magnetic chip or magnetic strip similar to credit
cards. When entering a secure area, the card is entered
into a machine along with a personal identification number.
This technique reduces the chance of an unauthorized
individual using a valid ID to gain access. Other
identification techniques involve the use of eye maps, hand
prints, or voice recognition in order to improve the
security and efficiency of the access process.
2 . Personnel Security
A major portion of the command and control system is
performed by individuals. It is essential that the
personnel assigned critical command and control functions be
trustworthy to perform their assigned duties and to protect
the sensitive command and control information.
The first aspect of personnel security is actually
performed by physical security methods. That is limiting
access to secure areas to only those individuals carrying
proper and current identification of authorization.
The process is much more complex when it comes to
determining which individuals should be given the proper
101
authorization for access. This begins with the background
investigation process and involves investigators
researching an individual's current and past associations
and actions to determine the trustworthiness of the
individual. The JCS describe this process as "personnel
security investigations".
PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - An inquiry into the
activities of an individual which is designed to develop
pertinent information pertaining to trustworthiness and
suitability for a position of trust as related to
loyalty, character, emotional stability, and
reliability. (JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 258)
.
Polygraphs can also be used to augment the background
investigation process.
Once background investigations have been conducted
and a person is allowed access to vital information,
periodic or aperiodic follow up investigations are
necessary. This follow up investigation is to help detect
compromises or a situation that can lead to a compromise.
The possibility of having the compromise of sensitive
information detected during the follow up investigation also
serves as a deterrence.
In addition to the background and follow up
investigations, the Department of Defense institutes a more
rigorous screening and monitoring program for individuals
who have direct access to nuclear weapons or nuclear command
and control information. This is called the Personnel
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Reliability Program (PRP) . The standards are much more
strict than normal classified material access. These
individuals do not receive assignment or training for the
critical positions until they have been fully screened.
(Carter, 1987, p. 60)
Another personnel security measure that is applied
to control of nuclear weapons and nuclear command and
control material is the policy of two person control. Under
this policy, nuclear weapons and certain nuclear command and
control material must be under the protection of two
individuals at all times. This increases the personnel
requirements, but also assures, to a greater extent, that
theft, tampering, modification, or substitution cannot
occur.
Despite all of these techniques, personnel security
remains one of the most difficult security measures to
design into a security system. Personnel security involves
human behavior and is therefore subject to the seeming
inconsistencies between motivation and action. Different
people will respond in different fashions to the same
situation. The uncertainty of human behavior must be
considered when designing a security system that involves
individuals. As the Federal Bureau of Investigation points
out in the following passage from the DOD Security Review
Commission's Report, personnel security is based on the
loyalty of the individual
.
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It is the responsibility of each individual, who has
been entrusted with sensitive data, to do his or her
share in protecting America's strategic knowledge. If
Americans do not conduct themselves in a responsible
manner, or do not recognize that this country's national
security is based upon the loyalty and efforts of its
citizens, then the tightest document classification
system, the most efficient security organizations, and
the strongest armed forces may be completely ineffective
in protecting citizens from "all enemies, foreign and
domestic." (Commission, 1985, p. 101)
3 . Information Security
Information security is an extremely broad field.
It involves techniques for protecting sensitive information
from being acquired by the adversary. Usually this
information is thought of as written documents or designs,
data or verbal messages transmitted over communication
systems, data stored within a computer, or information
transmitted over communication systems . The protection of
this information involves three types of security measures:




Within the Department of Defense there are three
security classification levels which were defined in Chapter
II: TOP SECRET, SECRET, and CONFIDENTIAL. Along with these
classification levels are a series of policies and
procedures issued by organizations up and down the chain of
command describing how to handle, store, disseminate, and
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destroy classified information (Commission, 1985, p. 47).
Executive Order 12356 provides the overall policy for the
entire Executive Branch of the United States Government
(Commission, 1985, p. 47) . These policies and procedures
identify methods for individuals to determine classification
levels for specific categories of information, with whom
they can share that information, the proper storage
containers within which the information can be stored, and
the proper methods for destroying the information once it is
no longer required.
Personnel security is concerned with assuring
that only trustworthy individuals are placed in positions
responsible for classified information. Procedural security
provides the rules under which these individuals must
perform in order to protect the information with which they
are entrusted. The procedures can only specify how
classified information should be handled, it is up to the
individual to follow those procedures.
Because of this dependence on the individual to
follow this guidance, procedural security is only as
effective as the least conscientious individual. If nine
out of ten individuals who have access to a particular piece
of classified information properly follow security
procedures, but one individual fails, for whatever reason,
to protect the information, the information is not 90%
protected. It is 100% compromised.
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Again, because procedural security is dependent
on the uncertainties of human behavior, intentional or
unintentional, it is one of the least reliable security
measures that can be applied. It is also the most
extensively used. Although it does not give 100%
effectiveness, when combined with other security measures,
it provides an extremely important layer of protection in a
security system.
b. Communication Security
Communication security is a vast and highly
technical field of security involved with protecting
information and data as it is transmitted over communication
systems. The JCS define communication security as follows:
COMMUNICATION SECURITY - The protection resulting from
all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons
information of value which might be derived from the
possession and study of telecommunications, or to
mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of
the results of such possession and study. Also called
COMSEC . Communication security includes a.
cryptosecurity; b. transmission security; c. emission
security; and d. physical security of communication
security materials and information.
1
.
cryptosecurity - The component of communication
security which results from the provision of technically
sound cryptosystems and their proper use.
2 transmission security - The component of
communication security which results from all measures
designed to protect transmissions from interception and
exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis
.
3. emission security - The component of communication
security which results from all measures taken to deny
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unauthorized persons information of value which might be
derived from intercept and analysis of compromising
emanations from crypto-equipment and telecommunication
systems
.
4 . physical security - The component of communication
security which results from all physical measures
necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material,
and documents from access thereto or observation thereof
by unauthorized persons. (JCS Pub 1, 1919, p. 77)
(1) Cryptosecurity . Cryptosecurity is probably
one of the most sensitive and highly classified of all
security measures. Effective cryptographic systems take
years to develop, evaluate, and field, but can be rendered
useless with even one compromise. It is also the security
measure that command and control is most heavily dependent
upon. Without the means to provide secure communications,
all secrecy of remote operations would be lost.
Cryptosecurity is an encryption/decryption
process by which the plaintext, voice or data messages, are
transformed into a ciphertext form for transmission. The
desired characteristics of the ciphertext include:
1
.
Non-disclosure - Only the intended recipient of the
message can decrypt and understand the contents of
the message.
2. Integrity - The message that is received is the same
message that was sent.
3. Authenticity - The message could only have come from
an authorized source.
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Although each cryptosystem is different in
its method of providing one or more of the desired
characteristics, they usually consist of:
1. Plaintext - The original message that is to be
securely transmitted over a communication system.
2
.
Cryptographic Transformation - The algorithm or
logic, used to transform the plaintext into the
ciphertext
.
3. Cryptographic Key - The unique settings of the
cryptographic transformation held only by the
authorized sender and intended receiver of the
message. This is often the most sensitive part of
the cryptosystem.
4. Synchronization Method - This is a means to assure
that the sending and receiving stations apply the
same cryptographic transformation to the same portion
of the message.
5. Ciphertext - The transformed message.
6. Key Management System - The method for assuring that
only the authorized sender and intended receiver have
the cryptographic key and that the proper
cryptographic key is utilized.
Chapter VI provides a general introductory discussion on
the field of cryptography.
(2) Transmission Security. Transmission
security deals with all methods used to protect
communications from interception and exploitation that do
not involve cryptography. These include anti-jam (AJ)
techniques, low probability of intercept (LPI) techniques,
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error detection and correction (EDAC) techniques, proper
communication protocol, and traffic flow security.
(a) Anti-Jam Techniques . Anti-jam
techniques try to minimize the effects of enemy jamming on a
communication system. Frequency hopping is one technique in
this category where portions of the signal are transmitted
in time blocks over changing frequencies (Ricci, 1986, p.
35) . Often the frequency changes are driven by a
cryptographic engine to assure a random appearance of the
hopping pattern. Another method to provide anti-jam
capability is by use of spread-spectrum techniques (Ricci,
1986, p. 35). Spread-spectrum techniques increase the
required transmission bandwidth thereby forcing a jammer to
increase its power requirements to jam this wider band of
frequencies. A third technique is the use of highly
directional antennas to minimize jamming energy that is not
located directly in the path between the authentic
transmitter and receiver.
(b) Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) .
Another category of transmission security involves trying to
prevent the interception, detection, or direction finding of
the signal. Spread spectrum technology can be used not only
for anti-jam purposes but also for LPI. By spreading the
bandwidth of the signal, the energy level transmitted at
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each frequency is reduced. If the signal is spread large
enough, the signal can become indistinguishable from the
surrounding noise making it difficult to discover and
intercept unless an adversary possesses the proper
spreading codes. Once the signal and noise are reconverted
by authorized receivers to their original bandwidth, the
signal will again become recognizable. Burst communications
and directional antennas can also improve the low
probability characteristics of a communication system.
(c) Error Detection and Correction . Error
detection and correction usually involve the transmission of
additional information about the message that will help to
indicate that an error has occurred in transmission. This
can be performed by a check-sum that is a mathematical
function of the message (Hoffman, 1977, p. 96) . If there
has been any error in transmission or an attempted
modification of the message, the check-sum computed at the
receiving station will not match the transmitted check-sum.
This will provide for detection of errors. More
sophisticated mathematical functions called forward error
correcting codes can not only help to detect errors in
messages but can often help to return the message to its
original status (J. Martin, 1976, p. 586).
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(d) Communication Protocol . Communication
protocol refers to how disciplined a communication system
operator is in using the system. This is related to
procedural security but deals directly with the use of
communication systems. Several techniques that fall into
this area include:
1. Using a communication system only when necessary
(Littlebury, 1986, p. 76)
.
2. Not using home made codes (JCS Pub 18, 1982, p. D-l).
3. Not "talking around" classified material on unsecured
systems (JCS Pub 18, 1982, p. D-l)
.
4. Operating only at the power output required to
communicate or achieve sensor functions (Littlebury,
1986, p. 76)
.
5. Reducing radio transmissions to no longer than 10-15
seconds (Littlebury, 1986, p. 76).
6. Limiting tuning time of transmitter (Ivanov, 1977,
p. 269) .
7. Changing call signs frequently (Ivanov, 1977, p.
269) .
8. Eliminating operator "signatures" or identifying
characteristics (Ivanov, 1977, p. 269)
.
9. Turning off transmitter high voltage after completion
of transmission. (Ivanov, 1977, p. 269)
.
(e) Traffic Flow Security . Traffic flow
security is a means for assuring that an adversary
monitoring the volume of traffic over communication systems
will not be able to gain significant indicators of a change
in operations. The JCS define traffic flow security as:
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TRAFFIC FLOW SECURITY - The protection resulting from
features, inherent in some crypto-equipment, which
conceal the presents of valid messages on a
communication circuit, normally achieved by causing the
circuit to appear busy at all times. (JCS Pub 1, 1979,
p. 354)
(3) Emission Security. There are two main
categories of emission security -- TEMPEST and emission
control. TEMPEST refers to a series of design and
shielding techniques to reduce the amount of secondary
radiation emitted by a piece of electromagnetic equipment
that may reveal sensitive information. Shielded containers
and vaults fall into this category.
The second major category of emission
security is emission control, often called EMCON . EMCON is
an order to friendly units specifying either forbidding
primary emission of radiation (radio or sensor), or the
selective emission of specific radiation. This is often
used to conceal the presence, size, or formation of friendly
forces. The JCS define EMCON as:
EMISSION CONTROL - The selective control of emitted
electromagnetic or acoustic energy to minimize its
detection by enemy sensors or to improve the performance
of installed friendly sensors. Also called EMCON. (JCS
Pub 1, 1979, p. 124)
(4) Physical Security. Although physical
security was discussed as a topic unto itself,
communication security relies so heavily on physical
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security, that it is also included as a subheading of
communication security. In this case it refers to the
physical security of communication security components. If
for instance a piece of communication security equipment
containing a cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key
were compromised, the adversary would have access to any
message sent over that communication system until the key or
the algorithm were changed. Cryptosecurity depends on
physical security to assure that only the authorized sender
and intended receiver have the means to transmit and receive
the encrypted message.
c. Computer Security
Computer security, like communication security,
is a vast topic unto itself. With the ever increasing use
and dependence on computers to perform and assist virtually
every aspect of command and control, there is also
increasing recognition for the importance of computer
security
.
Computer security as a discipline is relatively
new although some of its security techniques, such as
passwords, have been used all through the development of
computers. The primary objectives of computer security are:
1
.
To protect the information residing within the




2. To protect the integrity of the information residing
within the computer system from unauthorized
modification or elimination.
3. To protect the integrity of the process performed by
the computer system.
Although the objectives may be relatively easy
to state, the achievement of those objectives is a much more
difficult task. Two of a computer's primary assets, its
accessibility and the ease with which its instructions can
be changed, run counter to the objectives of computer
security. Even so, computer security is a dynamic and
growing field of security with the need for security
outrunning the available techniques
.
(1) Access Control. The first aspect of
computer security is the ability of a computer to control
access to information to only authorized individuals. This
can be performed through first allowing only certain
individuals to use a computer system or network. Passwords
and interactive query password systems can perform this
function. Once given access, there still must be a
mechanism to assure only the authorized users of stored and
processed information can retrieve or manipulate that data.
All users may not have authorization for all the information
in the computer system. A set of internal rules must be
established to assure this separation of information. This
is especially true if several levels of classified
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information are stored in a computer system and users carry
a variety of clearance levels. This is the multi-level
security problem. The access control problem becomes even
more difficult when multiple computers are linked together
in a network.
(2) Hardware Security. Computer hardware can be
subject to bugging, sabotage, modification, and
substitution. All of these actions can contribute to the
compromise of information or disabling the computer at
crucial times making them unavailable to perform critical
command and control tasks . Hardware security involves
maintaining the integrity of the hardware from as early as
when it is manufactured, through shipment, installation,
operation, maintenance, and even its disposal. Physical
security, inspections, equipment accountability, and
maintenance logs are all vital elements of hardware
security
.
(3) Operating System Security. The operating system
is just as important to a computer system as the hardware.
And just like the hardware, its integrity must be protected
to assure that critical command and control information is
processed properly. The operating system must also be
protected through all phases of its life cycle. If not,
trojan horses can be implanted during development,
installation, updating or, upgrading of operating systems
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with new changes. These can all be sources for unwanted
changes
.
(4) Software Security. Finally, software
security is of vital importance to assure that the
application programs themselves do not contain errors,
trojan horses, viruses, or worms. While independent line by
line inspection of software code can help to ensure the
accuracy and integrity of software, the magnitude of code
involved with many command and control projects precludes
using that technique for the entire project. There are
efforts to isolate critical functions or "security kernels"
(Hoffman, 1977, p. 142) to help to reduce the evaluation
effort. But again, once the software is determined to be
correct, it must be controlled to prevent modification after
certification
.
4 . Operation Security
The origin of operation security developed out of
lessons learned in Vietnam. Although traditional security
measures were employed, the enemy was still able to
determine operation times and objectives (JCS Pub 1, 1982,
p. 1-2). Analysis found that many unclassified indicators
were revealing the times and objectives as clearly as if
there were a compromise of classified information.
Operation security therefore deals with unclassified actions
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that reveal operational information. These include such
items as the sudden recall of men from leave, the
stockpiling in logistics channels of an unusual quantity of
supplies or unusual supplies, the arranging of tugs and
pilots to escort ships within harbors, or even submitting
change of address forms. All of these can reveal a change
from normal operations. The JCS define two terms important
to the discussion of operation security. They are the
definition of operation security itself and a definition of
operation security indicators.
OPERATION SECURITY - The protection of military
operations and activities resulting from the
identification and subsequent elimination or control of
indicators susceptible to hostile exploitation. Also
called OPSEC. (JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 247)
OPERATION SECURITY INDICATORS - Actions or information
normally considered unclassified, or things not normally
assigned a classification which provide an adversary a
tip-off that an operation or other activity will occur,
and bits and pieces needed in preparing appreciations
[assumptions, estimates, and facts about an opponent's
intentions and capabilities] prior to and during
operations or other activities, or about the classified
characteristics and capabilities of systems or
procedures, doctrine, tactics and techniques. (JCS Pub
1, 1979, p. 247)
JCS Pub 18, expands on these definitions. It
states that the key objective of OPSEC is to ensure mission
effectiveness (JCS Pub 18, 1982, p. II-3) . It also states
that the planning for secrecy extends beyond the simple
exposure of raw information to an adversary, but must also
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involve assumptions and estimates made by an adversary
through monitoring friendly habits of operation (JCS Pub
18, p. II-3) . OPSEC also applies when activities cannot be
concealed. In order to then maintain operation security,
military deception will be required to maintain the secrecy
of the mission.
Appendix D of JCS Pub 18 provides a listing of many
"indicators" that OPSEC seeks to eliminate or mask. A
sampling of these indicators is provided below:
1. Using homemade codes.
2
.
Requiring that routine reports be submitted at fixed
times
.
3. "Talking around" a classified subject.
4. Discussing logistic support needed, personnel
reporting, personnel arrival dates, dates, times,
plans, on non-secure radio or telephone.
5. Arranging the itinerary of senior officials to
attend classified conferences over non-secure radio
or telephone.
6. Using static call signs for particular units or
functions, and unchanging or infrequently changed
radio frequencies
.




9. Tests and exercise schedules.
10. Notices to mariners and airmen.
11. Special planning conferences.
12. Unusual actions with no apparent communications
having directed the actions.
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13. Having intensive maintenance and repair activity or
unusual volumes of requisitions to be filled by a
particular date.
14. Procuring of maps and charts.
15. Providing tailored training of personnel
16. Making personal arrangements with families.
17. Trash and garbage dumped by units or from ships at
sea
.
18. Discussion of repair and maintenance requirements in
unsecured areas
.
(JCS Pub 18, 1982, Appendix D)
.
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VI . INTRODUCTION TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
A. CODES AND CIPHERS
Because cryptography is so important to command and
control in protecting sensitive and classified information,
the following section introduces basic cryptographic
principles and techniques. It is intended to provide
insights into how cryptographic systems operate and the
various factors involved in their development and use.
Cryptography is a process by which an original message
(plaintext) is transformed into another form that cannot be
understood or changed by unauthorized individuals. It is
also one of the most sensitive and relied upon security
measures used to protect transmitted and stored command and
control information. The word cryptography is Greek for
"hidden writing" (Hoffman, 1977, p. 42). Codes are one form
of transformation that are often used. For example, ASCII
(American Standard Code for Information Interchange) is a
binary code for representing standard typewriter symbols
such as letter, numbers, and punctuation marks. For each
typewriter symbol there is a corresponding seven bit ASCII
binary code that represents that symbol. A matrix can be
constructed that relates each symbol to its binary code. If
the simple phrase "How are you?" were the original message
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or plaintext that was to be encoded, the previously
constructed table of relationships cou]d be used to
"transform" the plaintext into the ASCII or ciphertext of
the message. The message would appear as follows:



















In essence, the original message was the input to a
transformation process (ie., the set of instructions
describing how to change the plaintext into ciphertext)
.
The output is the ciphertext. The cryptographic process




As long as the transformation is known, the message can
be easily converted from plaintext to ciphertext and back
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again. The transformation from plaintext to ciphertext is
often called encryption or encoding. The reverse process
recovering the plaintext from the ciphertext is called
decryption or decoding.
Although the words codes and cipher are often used
synonymously, there are actually subtle technical
differences between the two. Ciphers usually operate on
plaintext units of fixed length such as single letters, or
fixed length groups of numbers (Hoffman, 1977, p. 42).
Technically speaking, the ASCII "code" would be considered a
cipher since it always operates on a single letter or symbol
at a time. Codes on the other hand can operate on variable
length linguistic entities, such as words or phrases
(Hoffman, 1977, p. 42) . Instead of using a letter for
letter substitution in the plaintext, a single code word
could be substituted for the entire phrase. If "How are
you" is represented by the code word "HARVEST", the name
"Mr. Brown" is represented by "WHEAT" and "Mrs. Brown" is
represented by "CORN", then the following encoded messages
could be written:
Plaintext: How are you Mr. Brown Ciphertext: HARVEST WHEAT
Plaintext: How are you Mrs. Brown Ciphertext: HARVEST CORN
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The JCS define codes and ciphers as follows:
CIPHER - Any cryptographic system in which arbitrary
symbols or groups of symbols represent units of plain
text of regular length , usually single letters, or in
which units of plaintext are rearranged, or both, in




1. Any system of communications in which arbitrary
groups of symbols represent units of plaintext of
varying length . Codes may be used for brevity or for
security.
2. A cryptosystem in which the cryptographic
equivalents (usually called "code groups") typically
consisting of letters or digits (or both) in otherwise
meaningless combinations are substituted for plaintext
elements which are primarily words, phrases, or
sentences. (JCS Pub 1, 1979, p. 69)
In the case of the ASCII system, the cipher is used to
translate from a typewriter character set to a binary
character set in order to facilitate the use of computers.
Sometimes codes are used to shorten messages. Most often,
both codes or ciphers are used to provide security for
transmitted messages. When that is the case, not only does
knowledge of the transformation process need to be
restricted to authorized senders and intended receivers of
messages, but careful attention must be paid to the rules of
the transformation to assure that the process cannot be
derived from the ciphertext.
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B. SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS OF CIPHERTEXT
As was briefly described in Chapter V, cryptosecurity is
the utilization of cryptography to provide security to
transmitted and stored messages or data. The three desired




Non-disclosure - Only the intended recipient of the
message can decrypt and understand the contents of
the message.
2. Integrity - The message that is received is the same
message that was sent.
3. Authenticity - The message could only have been sent
by an authorized source.
While not all cryptographic systems provide all three
characteristics, they all provide at least one. It depends
on the specific requirements of the application, which
characteristics should be incorporated. The implementation
of each charateristic has its own financial and operational
costs. To achieve non-disclosure, all users of the system
must have the same cryptographic key installed and a means
for distributing and protecting those keys. Message
integrity may require the transmission of longer messages
than the original in order to obtain error detection. While
each of these characteristics is desirable, they each have
their own costs to the user. Their implementation costs
must be weighed against the benefits they provide.
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C. GENERAL CIPHER SYSTEMS
The following discussion on cipher systems will deal
with five general classes of ciphers: simple substitution
ciphers, polyalphabetic substitution ciphers, infinite key
word ciphers, modern cipher systems, and public key
cryptography. This does not imply that these are the only
systems that are available, or even that they represent the
most important systems. The selection was made simply to
provide a basic understanding of the general mechanics of
cryptographic systems and to demonstrate the evolutionary
nature of cryptography. The public key cryptography is
included to show how cryptographic systems can be based on
different principles.
1 . Simple Substitution Ciphers
Simple substitution ciphers can be thought of as
taking each letter of the original plaintext message, and
substituting another letter or symbol to represent that
letter. The ASCII cipher discussed earlier is one example
of this type of system. Each potential letter or symbol of
the plaintext is replaced by one and only one unique
grouping of seven ones and zeros. An easier example to
visualize would be the use of two alphabets (including a
blank) - one in normal alphabetical order and the other
scrambled. By knowing the relationship between the
plaintext alphabet and the substitution alphabet, messages
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can be easily encrypted and decrypted. Without that
knowledge, the ciphertext appears on the surface to be
nonsense. For example, take the following
plaintext/substitution alphabet relationship to translate











In order for this system to be secure, the
transformation process (the relationship between the two
alphabets) must be kept secret or anyone could easily read
messages, change messages, or construct false messages. In
this case, recovery from a compromise would simply involve
developing a new substitution alphabet. But this also
requires a means for distributing the new cipher system to
authorized users and a means for protecting the new
transformation. Not all transformations are as easily
changed. An important principle in cryptography is that the
security of a system should not depend on the secrecy of
something which cannot be changed if it is compromised
(Diffie, 1979, p. 218)
.
Unfortunately, simply protecting the transformation
method is not enough to assure the security of this system.
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According to the prominent U.S. cryptologist William F.
Friedman, almost any simple substitution cryptogram of 25
characters or more can be broken by a skilled cryptanalyst
(Diffie, 1979, p. 220). In other words, the transformation
process is not strong enough to prevent an adversary from
"breaking" the system even without a compromise of the
alphabet. Knowledge of the frequency with which letters
appear in general usage and performing a frequency analysis
of the ciphertext can reveal which substitution letter
corresponds with which plaintext letter (Hoffman, 1977, p.
49) . The longer the length of the message the better the
statistics for frequency analysis.
2 . Polyalphabetic Substitution Ciphers
One method used to overcome the problems of the
simple substitution cipher is a polyalphabetic cipher. In
this method, rather than having one letter always represent
another letter, each ciphertext letter could actually
represent any or all plaintext letters at some point in the
message. This method requires not only a transformation
process, but also a key. Consider the example in Figure 19
This example points out several concepts of modern
cryptography. This first point is that cryptography is, in
essence, a mathematical process. By assigning each letter
in the alphabet a numerical value, the transformation











H + B = 8 + 2 MOD 27 = 10 = J
+ I = 15 + 9 MOD 27 = 24 = X
W + S = 23 + 19 MOD 27 = 15 =
b + = + 15 MOD 27 = 15 =
A + N = 1 + 14 MOD 27 = 15 =
R + B = 18 + 2 MOD 27 = 17 = Q
E + I = 5 + 9 MOD 27 = 14 = N
b + S = + 19 MOD 27 = 19 = s
Y + = 25 + 15 MOD 27 = 13 = M
+ N = 15 + 14 MOD 27 = 2 = B
U + B = 21 + 2 MOD 27 = 23 = W
b + I = + 9 MOD 27 = 9 = I
M + S = 13 + 19 MOD 27 = 5 = E
R + = 18 + 15 MOD 27 = 6 = F
S + N = 19 + 14 MOD 27 = 6 = F
b + B = + 2 MOD 27 = 2 = B
B + I = 2 + 9 MOD 27 = 11 = K
R + S = 18 + 19 MOD 27 = 10 = J
+ = 15 + 15 MOD 27 = 3 = C
W + N = 23 + 14 MOD 27 = 10 = J
N + B = 14 + 2 MOD 27 = 16 = P
Plaintext
:
HOW ARE YOU MRS BROWN
Ciphertext JXOOOQNSMBWIEFFBKJCJP
Figure 19. Polyalphabetic Substitution Cipher
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ciphertext. In this case, a straight numerical ordering of
the letters of the standard alphabet is used with a "blank"
equal to 0, "A" equal to 1, and "Z" equal to 26.
The mathematical transformation was a simple modulo
addition. Modulo addition can be thought of as "clock
arithmetic" . On the face of the normal clock are twelve
characters. If the first number in an addition process is
"2" and the second number is "4", then the modulo addition
process would count four positions from "2" to arrive at "6"
on the face of the clock (2+4 MOD 12 = 6) . If instead
the first number was "9" and the second number was "6", the
same procedure would yield an answer of "3" on the face of
the clock (9+6 MOD 12 = 3) . Using military time, if an
operation were to begin at 2100 (9:00pm) and take 6 hrs . for
completion, the operation would conclude at 0300.
(2100 + 600) MOD 2400 = 2700 MOD 2400 = 2700 - 2400 = 0300.
The modulus military time works with is MOD 2400. The
modulus of the original example was 27 (the length of the
alphabet plus a blank)
.
Since computers perform many functions in modern
electronic systems, often a convenient modulus to use in
these binary operations is a modulus of 2. This corresponds
to binary addition without a carry or, in electrical
circuits, to an "exclusive OR" gate. The truth table for




+ 1 = 1
1 + = 1
1 + 1 =
An interesting property of modulo two addition is
that if the same key that produced a ciphertext is modulo
two added again to the ciphertext, the result will be the
plaintext. This makes the decryption process exactly the
same as the encryption process with the roles of ciphertext
and plaintext reversed.
Another important point that the BISON key example
on page 128 demonstrates is that using a polyalphabetic
cipher, the same plaintext letter is not always represented
by the same ciphertext letter, and the same ciphertext
letter can represent many plaintext letters. In this short
message, the plaintext letter "O" is represented
respectively by the ciphertext letters "X", "B", and "C"
.
Similarly, the ciphertext letter "0" represents the
plaintext "W","b", and "A". While this is an improvement
over the simple substitution system, it also requires more
effort to encrypt and to decrypt the message.
This polyalphabetic transformation consists of three
important elements; the transformation algorithm (MOD 27
addition) ; the key (BISON) ; and the alignment or
"synchronization" of the plaintext to the key. In this
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case, the transformation algorithm is a simple process. But
even if an adversary knew that the algorithm was MOD 27
addition, he should not be able to determine the plaintext
from the ciphertext unless he could determine the
cryptographic key . If the key were securely protected from
compromise, then, theoretically communications would be
secure provided the ciphertext does not reveal information
about the underlying key. This requires a key management
system in order to distribute and protect the proper key.
In regards to synchronization , if the key were
shifted by one letter of the plaintext, then an entirely
different ciphertext would be produced. If an intended
recipient did not know where to begin the key, it would be
difficult, if not impossible to decrypt the message.
One last point to notice in this example of
polyalphabetic substitution is that a major portion of the
key was actually transmitted. Because a blank was assigned
the value of zero, and because the blank appeared four times
in this short message, the key was therefore added to the
blank's zero value four times, resulting in transmission of
a portion of the key. The irregular spacing of the blanks
throughout the message allowed a different key letter to be
transmitted in place of each blank so that four out of the
five key letters were transmitted: "0", "S", "I", "B" . If
the message were even longer, the entire key may have been
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transmitted. This begins to show how difficult it is to
design secure transformations.
3 . Infinite Key Word Ciphers
Conceptually, as the key of polyalphabetic
substitution ciphers becomes longer and longer, and
approaches a random nature, the cryptographic system should
become more and more secure (Hoffman, 1977, p. 59). If this
concept is taken to its extreme limit, then a key,
infinitely long and completely random, should be completely
secure. In fact many one time systems can be mathematically
proved to be "unconditionally secure" from cryptanalysis
(Diffie, 1979, p. 219). One time tapes and many codebooks
represent this type of system. Although this type of system
appears to be ideal, it requires that a new key be used for
each message (one time use) , and everyone receiving the
message must know what key is being used for which message
and where to start the synchronization. The problem then
becomes a key development, distribution, storage, security,
destruction, and accounting nightmare, especially when the
volume of transmitted traffic is high. Despite these
logistics problems, one time tapes and codebooks are still
used.
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4 . Modern Cipher Systems
In order to decrease the burden of storing an
infinite amount of cryptographic key, many modern
cryptographic systems have modified their cryptographic
processes and adapted them to modern digital electronics.
Instead of using an infinite key, many modern systems use a
finite key and a complex mathematical transformation
(algorithm) to generate a pseudo-random number called a
keystream. This keystream is often a binary stream of ones
and zeros that are then modulo 2 added to a digital
representation of the plaintext message. The result of this
modulo two addition is the ciphertext. If the same
keystream can be generated at a receiving site, and can be
properly aligned or synchronized with the plaintext, then a
simple modulo 2 addition of the ciphertext and the keystream
will again reveal the digital plaintext. This process is
shown in Figure 20.
If the transformation process is designed properly
and the key has not been compromised, the next pseudo-random
number in the keystream cannot be predicted. In actuality
the pseudo-random process will eventually cycle back to its
beginning and repeat itself. The key must be changed prior
to the beginning of a new cycle in order to preserve
security. The security of this process is highly dependent
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With this type of system, both the sender and the
recipient must be able to generate the same keystream and
therefore must possess the same key. A compromise at either
site will result in an insecure system and the key must be
securely changed.
5 . Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography (PKC) is a relatively recent
development (Bamford, 1982, p. 350). Rather than basing its
security on a securely generated keystream, the security is
based on the difficulty (computational infeasibility) of
solving certain mathematical relationships. One of the
beneficial aspects of a PKC system is that both the sender
and the receiver can have different keys, thereby reducing
the possibility of compromise. One key is held secret and
the other can be made public, hence the name "public key
cryptography". The following discussion will describe how a
sender can use a publicly published key to encrypt a
message that can be read only by the intended recipient.
The example will use a publicly available algorithm
developed by the mathematicians Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
(RSA) as described in Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman's
paper, "Privacy and Authentication: An Introduction to
Cryptography" (Diffie, 1979, pp. 233-234) . While there are
other usages of public key systems, and other approaches to
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public key cryptography, the RSA algorithm will provide a
good understanding of how public key systems operate.
The RSA algorithm operates on a fixed block of a
plaintext digital message (roughly 700 bits) at a time. The
message will correspond to a number "M" . RSA uses the
mathematical property that a number (M) , successively raised
to two different numbers ( E and D) , is the same as raising
the original number to the product of the later two. This
can be mathematically shown as follows:
(ME ) D = ME
* D
E DAlso, if the product of E and D is equal to one, then (M )
is equal to M.
(ME ) D = ME
* D
= M1 = M (If E * D = 1)
Another mathematical property that the RSA algorithm
uses is the fact that finding the prime factors of the
product of two large (over 100 digits) prime numbers is
computationally infeasible (Diffie, 1979, p. 233). In other
words, given only a very large number that is the product of
two prime numbers, it is extremely difficult to find the
original pair of prime numbers. For example, given only the
number 146,550,809, it is computationally infeasible to
factor that number into its two prime components 9533 and
15,373. It is easy to find two primes and multiply them
together. It is not easy to find the two primes given only
the product.
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The last mathematical concept that is used is a
property discovered by the mathematician Leonhard Euler
(1707 - 1783) . Beginning with a number (N) which is the
product of two prime numbers (P and Q) , he proved that the
number of integers less than N, that are relatively prime to
N, is equal to (P-l) * (Q-l) . This property is known as the
"Euler totient function", PHI (N) . Relatively prime numbers
are numbers that have only one as a common prime factor. An
example of PHI (N) follows. Given the two prime numbers 3
and 7, their product would be 21. Factoring all the numbers
between 2 and 21, and eliminating those with common prime
factors, there are only 12 numbers
(1,2,4,5,8,10,11,13,16,17,19, and 20) that do not have 3 or
7 as one or more of their prime factors. The Euler totient
function would predict that there would be:
PHI (21) = (3 - 1) * (7 - 1) = 2 * 6 = 12
This process becomes even more difficult and lengthy as the
numbers become larger.
The RSA system begins with the following variables:
M = The numerical representation of the message.
P = First selected large prime number.
Q = Second selected large prime number.
N = Computed product of P * Q
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E - An arbitrary number (to be published)
D = A computed number such that E * D = 1 MOD (PHI (N)
)
(D is kept secret)
The first step in establishing the RSA system so
that anyone can encrypt a message but only the intended
recipient can decrypt the message, is to compute the number
N.
N = P * Q
N is made public but its factors P and Q are kept
secret by the intended recipient. Next, the intended
recipient computes PHI (N)
.
PHI (N) = (P-l) * (Q-l)
Since only the recipient has P and Q, only he can compute
PHI (N) since it requires knowledge of P and Q. It is the
difficulty of factoring N that protects P and Q.
The recipient then arbitrarily selects a number E
that is greater than 2 and less than PHI (N) . He then
computes the number D so that E * D = 1 in the modulus
PHI (N) . D is kept secret by the recipient, but both E and N
can be published in a telephone book type listing of public
keys. The system is now established.
If someone wants to encrypt a message so that only a
specific person could read it, they look up in a book the
public E and N listed for the intended recipient and perform
an exponentiation of the message.
ME MOD N = C = Ciphertext
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Nothing in the public information would allow for
the recovery of the original message. That would require
being able to determine D. Since D requires the knowledge
of PHI (N) and PHI (N) requires knowledge of P and Q, D cannot
be determined unless P and Q are known. Since P and Q are
held only by the recipient, only he can decrypt the message.
To decrypt the message, the indented recipient
simply raises the ciphertext to the D power in MOD N to
recover the plaintext.
CD MOD N = (ME ) D MOD N = ME
* D MOD N = M1 MOD N = M
Although the process is based on sophisticated




A. THE BALANCE OF SECURITY AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
The previous chapters have highlighted the importance of
security to command and control . Since command and control
is the decision making and coordination process of an
organization and a military force, it is crucial that the
elements of command and control be preserved. Collecting
and processing of information, developing of decision
alternatives, making the decisions themselves, and
disseminating those decisions to those tasked with various
actions, are all crucial to the effective and efficient
accomplishment of the organization's goals and objectives.
They not only must be preserved from destruction or
disruption, but they also must protect the confidentiality
of the organization's plans and methods.
Security is required to preserve the command and
control process in a hostile environment. Once security is
recognized as a indispensable element of command and
control, the required level of security must next be
determined. The actual achieved security is dependent on
both the threat and the costs of the security measures. It




A threat is uncertain in nature. An estimate of the
threat must be established and security measures designed to
oppose or repel that design baseline threat level. This can
be the maximum or "potential" threat; it can be a probable
threat; or it can be a likely scenario threat. Whatever
the designed level of security, there is always the
possibility or probability that the actual hostile action
will exceed the security level. This is especially true
over time. Static security measures may deteriorate over
time or fail to meet an evolving threat. Security is highly
dependent on the threat
.
Ideally, all systems would be designed to repel the
maximum potential threat. Unfortunately this is often
impossible both financially and operationally. The price of
all the security measures, their operation, and maintenance
can be exceedingly high. The restrictions and constraints
they impose upon operations, may be overly restrictive.
Security must be viewed as one of a combination of elements
needed to accomplish the commander's mission. It is not the
objective in and of itself. JCS Pub 18 identifies seven




Adversaries must have some knowledge of friendly
capabilities and intentions so they will perceive
threats
.
2. The public must know something about military
capabilities to foster recruitment of friendly
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personnel and gain internal political support and
support for alliances.
3. The Military Departments/Services must test
rigorously and in realistic environments, systems,
procedures, doctrine, and tactics.
4
.
The Armed Forces must broadly understand
capabilities, conduct extensive and thorough
training, and execute realistic, demanding exercises
to develop personnel skills, determination, unity,
morale, and readiness.
5. Allies must share information and exercise together
to develop competence and mutual trust.
6. Planners and those preparing to execute actions must
thoroughly understand plans to realize optimal
coordination and effectiveness of undertakings.
7. Commanders must test and exercise command
procedures, organizations, communications, staffs,
and operational concepts to ensure readiness.
(JCS Pub 18, 1982, pp. II-4 - II-5)
In addition to the operational factors that must be
balanced against the need for security are the underlying
motivations for the mission. The purpose of national
defense for a country is the safety and security of its
citizens, its territory, and the preservation of its
national principles and character. Providing "for the
common defense" is clearly established in the preamble to
the Constitution of the United States as one of the primary
objectives of the United States Government. But that is not
its only objective. Within the same sentence, the
Constitution also establishes securing "the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity" as an equal
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objective and further enumerates the individual's rights of
liberty within the Bill of Rights. There must be a balance
between the need for security and the preservation of
individual rights. The balance is not always easily
established. Still, that balance must be sought. Without a
balance, national security may be preserved, but at the cost
of liberty; or liberty may be lost for the lack of security.
In both cases, the principles to be protected have been
lost. Security must not destroy what it is supposed to
protect. Placed in its proper perspective, security must
always be viewed as the means to preserve what is important.
B. RECOMMENDED FUTURE STUDIES
This thesis has attempted to provide a conceptual
foundation for the further study of command and control
security. Because the thesis covered a wide range of
topics, its depth in any one area was limited. The
following is a list of possible future topics that deserve
further development:
1. Studies to prove or disprove the hypotheses stated
in this thesis.
2. Studies to expand the knowledge base of specific
security measures or threats.
3. Studies to determine effective measures of threat
levels and security levels.
4. Studies on how to develop the probability
distributions of various threats.
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5. Studies on how to determine the most appropriate
level of threat to design for.
6. Studies on the economics of security.
2
7. Studies and analyses of historical C security
failures or successes and their implications for C
security designs
.
8. Studies on the effectiveness of specific security
measures
.




APPENDIX A - FORMAL DEFINITIONS
Definition 1 ; Security - is a condition, level, state of
nature, or feeling of being safe which results from the
establishment and maintenance of security measures.
Definition 2 ; Security measures - are those procedures or
technologies taken by an individual or group to protect
against actions that threaten, impair, or destroy its
survival or effectiveness.
Definition 3 : Security elements - are groupings of security
measures that protect against a common threat or act in a
similar manner. Examples of security elements are physical
security, communication security, computer security, and
emission security.
Definition 4 : Protected Item - is the object, system, idea,
information, or characteristic that requires security.
Definition 5 : Value - is the remaining importance or
effectiveness of the protected item measured in a percentage
of its full importance or effectiveness.
Definition 6 : Security Level - is the percentage of the
potential threat that the security system can resist.
Definition 7 : Vulnerability Level - is the percentage of
the potential threat that the security system cannot resist.
The vulnerability level is equal to the difference between
the threat level and the security level
.
Definition 8 : Threat - is the potential force an adversary
can exert to decrease the value of the protected item.
Definition 9 ; Threat Level - is the measure of the
potential force an adversary can exert measured in a
percentage of the maximum force level
.
Definition 10 : Hostile Action - is the actual execution of
a threat
.
Definition 11 : A system is a set of elements united as a
whole for achieving a goal
.
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APPENDIX B - HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1 : Security can be considered a spectrum of
states of nature ranging from imminent danger (no security)
to pure safety (full security)
.
Hypothesis 2 : Security is a function of the detection,
response, and penalty mechanisms (security measures) applied
to the environment.
Hypothesis 3 : The greater the probability of detection, the
greater the security.
Hypothesis 4 : The greater the reliability of response, the
greater the security.
Hypothesis 5 : The greater the magnitude of the penalty, the
greater the security.
Hypothesis 6 : Detection, response, and penalty security
measures cannot exist independent of each other.
Hypothesis 7 : Security is a function of how the threat





Security is a function of time.
Threat is a function of time.
Security measures are a function of
time
.
Corollary 7.4 : Security is a function of the threat.
Corollary 7.5 : Security measures must be maintained
relative to the threat or their effectiveness
deteriorates over time.
Corollary 7.6 : Security measures and the threat are in
a constant, cyclical, action/response, and
evolutionary relationship.
Hypothesis 8 : The relationship between a threat, security
measures, and the value of a protected item is a process
with threat as the input, the security measures as the




Hypothesis 9 : The threat and security measure can be
composed of several different individual elements.
Hypothesis 10 : For each security measure, there is an
associated theoretical probability of successfully stopping
a particular threat, ultimately affecting the value of the
protected item.
Hypothesis 11 : The combination of all security processes is
a system (security system)
.
Hypothesis 12 : There are costs associated with employing
security measures
.
Hypothesis 13 : Command and Control is a function performed
by the commander.
Hypothesis 14 : The commander operates within a larger
organization
.
Hypothesis 15 : The commander is specifically assigned to
his position by the organization.
Hypothesis 16 : The commander is assigned a specific mission
to accomplish.
Hypothesis 17 : The commander is assigned authority over
specific forces.
Hypothesis 18 : The commander accomplishes his mission
through his assigned forces.
Hypothesis 19 : Command and control is the process by which
a commander exercises his authority.
Hypothesis 20 : Command and control is a decision making and
force directing process.
Hypothesis 21 : Command and control incorporates the
functions of planning, directing, coordinating, and
controlling of forces and operations to accomplish its
decision making and force directing process.
Hypothesis 22 : Essential elements of command and control
are the commander, the mission, the assigned forces, the
organization, and the means to decide and direct.
Hypothesis 23 : The command and control system is the means




Hypothesis 24 : The command and control system consists of
personnel, eqi.jipment, communications, facilities, and
procedures
.
Hypothesis 25 : The primary characteristics of a command and
control system are connectivity, accuracy, timeliness,
authenticity, secrecy, covertness, availability, and
af fordability
.
Hypothesis 26 : The commander is shown a filtered
representation of the current situation through his command
and control system, not the actual situation.
Hypothesis 27 : Errors and biases can be introduced by the
command and control system.
Hypothesis 28 : The commander is totally reliant on his
command and control system to provide accurate information
and to accurately disseminate his decisions.
Hypothesis 29 : A threat is a possible, future hostile or
injurious action.
Hypothesis 30 : There is a probability of occurrence
associated with each threat.
Hypothesis 31 : A hostile act is the realization of a
threat. It is a threat that is being executed.
Hypothesis 32 : The potential threat is the maximum force or
effort an adversary can expend if all of his resources were
applied to this single effort to breach security measures.
Hypothesis 33 : The probable threat is an estimate of the
most likely levels of force an adversary will expend in his
efforts to breach the security measures.
Hypothesis 34 : A vulnerability is the lack of adequate
security measures to protect against potential threats.
Hypothesis 35 : Vulnerabilities are inherent characteristics
of a design.
Hypothesis 36 : A system designer does not have control over
the threat
.
Hypothesis 37 : A system designer does have control over the
design vulnerabilities through the design security level.
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